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I. INTRODUCTION
Energy development is the economic lifeblood of many Indian
tribes. A number of tribal economies are heavily dependent upon
fossil fuel extraction, and for many tribes, fossil fuels are the single
greatest source of tribal revenue.'
Indian lands contain extensive reserves of fossil fuels and other
energy minerals: three to four percent of known oil and gas
reserves, up to thirty percent of the coal west of the Mississippi,
and approximately one third of the country's uranium resources. 2
Over 2.7 million acres of Indian lands support more than 4800
producing mineral leases, almost all of which are for oil and gas.3
Production on Indian lands represents 5% of domestic oil
production, 8% of natural gas production, and 2% of coal
production.4 Royalties exceed $542 million, the vast majority of
1. See, e.g., 7ribal Develapment olfE'nei Resoarces and the Creation of Enerq/1obs on Indian
Lands, Oversight Hearing Beoie the Subconim. on Indian and Alaska Native Affairs of tIhe II.
Comm. on Nalural Resources, 112th Cong. 44 (2011) [hereinafter 7ribal Devnelodnent Ilealing]
(statement of Irene C. CtIch, Ute Tribal Business Committee) ("[T]he Tribe's primary
source of income is from oil and gas."); Indian Enliery Development: (versighl Heating Be/oae
S. Commn. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 15 (2008) [hereinafter Indian Enery Ilearing 2008]
(testimony of Chairman Carl Venne, Crow Nation) (stating that "most of our
governmental revenue is derived from" mineral development); 7ribal Eneg Self -uafficiency
Act and the Native Aierican Eney Developneal and SelfDetermnination Act: Hearing oan S. 424
and S. 522 lefane the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. 115 (2003) [hereinafter Tibal
Energy Heating] (statement of Vernon Hill, Chairman, Eastern Shoshone Business Council
of the Wind River Reservation) (noting that oil and gas production "is the primary source
of revenue for the Tribes"); see also Mireya Navarro, Navajos Hope to Shiftfrim Coal to Wind
and Sun, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2010, at A12, available al http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/10/26/science/earth/26navajo.html?_-=1&emc=etal (reporting that coal accounts
for more than one third of the Navajo Nation operating budget, and is the largest source
of revenue after government grants and taxes).
2. MARJANE AMBLER, BREAKING THE IRON BONDS: INDIAN CONTROL OF ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT 74 (1990); U.S. FOREST SERV., FOREST SERVICE NATIONAL RESOURCE GUIDE
TO AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE RELATIONS app. D at D-1 (1997), available at
www.fs.fed.us/people/tribal/tribexd.pdf. Other minerals produced on Indian lands have
included copper, gypsum, sand and gravel, silica sand, and sulfur. U.S. MINERALS MGMT.
SERV., MINERAL REVENUES 2000: REPORT ON RECEIPTS FROM FEDERAL AND AMERICAN
INDIAN LEASES 92-93 (2000), available at http://www.onrr.gov/stais/pdfdocs/mrr00.pdf.
3. OFFICE OF NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, TOTAL
PRODUCING AND NON-PRODUCING LEASES BY CATEGORY AND MINERAL PRODUCTION TYPE,
(Oct. 26, 2011), www.onrr.gov/ONRRWebStaLs/Home.aspx (showing that the Department
of Interior administered 5204 Native American leases, of which 4843 were producing; the
producing leases included 4795 oil and gas leases, 7 coal leases, and 56 leases for other
minerals, including one geothermal lease).
4. Lynn H. Slade, Mineral and Energy Devehlment on Native American Lands: Shategies
for Addressing Soveteigny, Regilation, Rights and Cultue, 56 ROCKY MTN. MINERAL L. INST.
5A-1 (2010).
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which are generated by oil, gas, and coal production.5 All told,
Indian lands account for more than ten percent of federal on-
shore energy production.6 Moreover, the Department of the
Interior estimates that 15 million additional acres of energy
resources on Indian lands, containing some "5 billion barrels of
oil, 37 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 53 billion tons of coal
that are technically recoverable with current technologies," lie
undeveloped.7
Renewable energy resources on Indian lands are similarly
abundant.8 Several dozen tribes have lands suitable forwind power
development,9 and a number of other tribes possess geothermal
resources'o and opportunities for solar development." Biomass
5. OFFICE OF NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE, U.S. DEP'T. OF THE INTERIOR,
AMERICAN INDIAN REPORTED ROYALTY REVENUES FISCAL YEAR (2011), available at
www.onrr.gov/ONRRWebStats/Home.aspx (reporting total royalties of $542.7 million,
including $144.7 million from gas, $270.6 million from oil, and $74.4 million from coal;
royalties accounted for 99.5% of all lease revenues, and coal, gas, natural gas liquids, and
oil accounted for more than 93% of fiscal year 2011 royalties).
6. Tribal Energy Hearing, supra note 1, at 93-94 (statement of Theresa Rosier,
Counselor to the Asst. Sec. for Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior).
7. Indian Energy Hearing 2008, supra note 1, at 47 (statement of Dr. Robert W.
Middleton, Dir., Office of Indian Energy and Economic Development, Department of the
Interior).
8. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND
RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON INDIAN LANDS 23-26 (2000), available at
ftp://ftp.eia.doe.gov/pub/pdf/renewables/ilands.pdf [hereinafter Energy Consumption]
(listing and discussing reservations with the highest potential for renewable energy
projects). The National Renewable Energy Laboratory has produced a series of maps
showing the overlap of tribal lands and the resource potential for solar photovoltaic (PV),
concentrated solar power (CSP), wind, biomass and biofuels, and geothermal energy. Id.
at 13-17. The Argonne National Laboratory has also produced maps showing the overlap
of tribal lands and solar potential from PV panels and from concentrating collectors. See
ARGONNE NAT'L LAB., SOLAR POTENTIAL FROM PV PANEL, http://teeic.anl.gov
/documents/maps/solll4.pdf; ARGONNE NAT'L LAB., SOLAR POTENTIAL FROM
CONCENTRATING COLLECTOR, http://teeic.anl.gov/documents/maps/soll13.pdf.
9. Energy Consumption, supra note 8, at 28 (identifying approximately 45 reservations
with Class 5 or 6 winds, and 48 more with Class 4 winds); id. at 21 ("Areas designated class
4 or greater are suitable for most utility-scale wind turbine applications .... "); Indian
Energy Hearing 2008, supra note 1, at 47 (statement of Dr. Robert W. Middleton, Dir.,
Office of Indian Energy and Econ. Dev., Dep't of the Interior) (identifying 23 million
acres on 77 reservations with significant wind power potential). For discussions of tribal
wind projects, see Michael L. Connolly, Commercial Scale Wind Industry on the Campo Indian
Reservation, 23-Sum. NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 25 (2008); Patrick M. Carry, Candice J.
Spurlin & Derek A. Nelsen, Wind Energy in Indian Country: A Study of the Challenges and
Opportunities Facing South Dakota 7ibes, 54 S.D. L. REV. 448 (2009).
10. Energy Consumption, supra note 8, at 29 (identifying 57 reservations with "some
potential" for geothermal electricity production, an additional 72 with potential for
geothermal direct heat applications, and the remaining with "the potential for geothermal
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potential is even more widespread, with the Department of the
Interior identifying 118 reservations with "a high potential" of
producing biomass.12
Renewable energy resources are taking on increasing
importance for both Indian tribes and the nation as a whole.' 3 A
variety of factors has sparked the current national interest in
renewable energy, including energy independence and security,
climate change, and increasing energy prices.14 Indian tribes share
these interests, but bear some disproportionate consequences.
Tribes have historically benefitted less from the extraction of fossil
fuels from tribal lands than their non-Indian lessees and the
states. 15 The effects of climate change and other negative impacts
of extractive resource industries may hit tribes especially hard,
particularly because their cultural and economic well-being is
intimately connected to the "place" of the tribe's homeland.16 In
heat pump use").
11. Id. at 30 (identifying 17 reservations "with some areas" having the highest level
of solar radiation energy (insolation), and 66 reservations with the next highest level). For
a discussion of tribal solar development, see Ryan David Dreveskracht, Native Nation
Ecniionic Developmeint via the Inplementalion of Solar Projects: Iow to Make It Work, 68 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 27 (2011).
12. Tribda Develonuent Iaing 2008, supra note 1, at 47 (statement of Dr. Robert W.
Middleton, Dir., Office of Indian Energy and Economic Development, Department of the
Interior); see also Enery Consuniplion, supra note 8, at 29 (noting 118 reservations with 5-40
megawatt levels of biomass resource; reservations with less than 5 megawatt levels "would
not be candidates for biomass development").
13. See Indian Einery and Ene' Eficiency: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs,
111th Cong. 29 (2009) [hereinafter Indian Enery Hearing 2009] (statement of Hon. James
Roan Gray, Chairman, Indian Counntry Renewable Energy Consortium Board of Directors)
("It is simply not possible . .. [for the United States]to achieve our renewable energy goals
that the President has laid out without the serious development of those resources in
Indian Country.").
14. See, e.g., Ronald H. Rosenberg, Diversifying Amuerica's Eniiet Future: 7Te Future of
Renewable Wind Power, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 505, 505-07 (2008); Carolyn Fischer & Louis
Preonas, Combining Policies fir Renewable Eneigy: Is the Whole Less thma the Sum olls Paris?
(Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 10-19, 2010) at 3, available al
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1569634.
15. See, e.g., Connolly, supia note 9, at 25 (noting that in the case of a wind project,
"the county receives more revenue from taxing the tribe's lessee business partners than
the tribe receives from lease payments"); Robert Gough, Tribal Wind Power Developm"ient in
the Nnihern Grea/ Plains, 19-Fall NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 57 (2004) (noting that
reservations bear the impacts of extractive energy activities while "the resident tribal
communities are the limited end-use consumers of relatively higher-priced energy
services").
16. See, e.g., Dana E. Powell & DAilan J. Long, Landscapes (if Power: Renewable Enleio
Activismui in. Dive Bikeyah, in INDIANS & ENERGY: EXPLOITATION AND OPPORTUNITY IN THE
AMERICAN SOUTHWEsT 231 (Sherry L. Smith & Brian Frehner eds., 2010); Daniel Cordalis
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addition, the economic value of extractive industries fluctuates
dramatically, as indicated by a significant drop in tribal royalties
from fossil fuels in fiscal years 2009 and 2010.17
Despite the central importance of energy production for many
tribes, very few engage directly in energy development. Far more
commonly, energy tribes partner with, or even depend upon, non-
Indian companies for exploration, extraction, and processing. The
presence of non-Indian companies, in turn, triggers application of
the Nonintercourse Act" and the necessity of federal statutory
authority for energy development activities.' 9
Current statutory authority works reasonably well for the
development of traditional extractive mineral resources. Tribes
have the opportunity to enter into virtually any type of
development deal that suits their needs, although most mineral
deals are still subject to approval by the Secretary of the Interior.
The statutory scheme, however, is less than ideal for the
& Dean B. Suagee, The Effects of Climate Change on American Indian and Alaska Native Tibes,
22-Wtr. NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 45, 46-47 (2008); Elizabeth Ann Kronk, Alternative Eneygy
Development in Indian Country: Lighting the Way for the Seventh Generation, 46 IDAHO L. REv.
449, 451-56 (2010); Rebecca Tsosie, Climate Change, Sustainability and Globalization: Charting
the Future of Indigenous Environmental Self-Determination, 4 ENvTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J.
188, 208-37 (2009); Aileo Weinmann, The New Energy Future in Indian Country, NAT'L
WILDLIFE FED., March 23, 2010, available at http://www.nwf.org/News-and-
Magazines/Media-Center/Reports/Archive/2010/The-New-Energy-Future-in-Indian-
Country.aspx.
17. Mineral royalties in fiscal year 2010 were $395.5 million, and were $389.5 million
in fiscal year 2009. In fiscal year 2011, royalties rebounded to $542.6 million, close to the
$543.2 million in royalties earned in fiscal year 2008. During each of these years, royalties
from fossil fuels (coal, oil, gas, and natural gas liquids) comprised between 89 and 97% of
all mineral royalties. U.S. OFFICE OF NATURAL RES. REVENUE, supra note 5; see also Navarro,
supra note I (reporting a decline of 15 to 20% in Navajo revenues from coal in recent
years).
18. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2006) (originally enacted as Nonintercourse Act of 1834,
amending I Stat. 137 (1790)) ("No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of linds,
or of any title or claim thereto, from an Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any
validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into
pursuant to the Constitution.").
19. See Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 8 (1899) (conveyance of Indian title requires
"the consent of the United States"); Coey v. Low, 77 P. 1077, 1079 (Wash. 1904) (leases
and agreements encumbering Indian lands "must be authorized and sanctioned by some
act of Congress or treaty regulation"); see also Lease of Indian Lands for Grazing Purposes,
18 U.S. Op. Att'y Gen. 235, 237 (1885) (Nonintercourse Act prevents tribes from
"imparting any interest or claim" in lands "without the consent of the Government of the
United States."). Tribal trust lands-the type of Indian lands at issue in this article-are
inalienable and therefore not subject to taxation or other encumbrance without
congressional consent. See Cass Cnty. v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S.
103, 112-13 (1998).
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development of renewable energy resources. The mineral
development statutes offer great flexibility, but the uncertainty of
whether all energy sources are "minerals" impedes the statutes'
usefulness for renewable energy projects. A variety of other federal
laws are available for renewables development, but none applies to
all renewable energy sources and all have limits on what role the
tribes may take in the development process. The recent Indian
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act 20
(ITEDSA) appears to solve the issues posed by the other statutes,
but it has so far proven unattractive to energy tribes.
This Article discusses the range of current statutes and the
problems attendant on using them for renewable energy
development: the definitional issue in using the mineral statutes,
the passive role assigned to tribes in the other statutes, and why
ITEDSA, designed to resolve these issues, has not worked. Recent
congressional initiatives to broaden tribal options are then
surveyed and critiqued. The Article concludes with some
suggestions to ease the process of tribal renewable energy
development and allow tribes to take more active roles in that
development.
II. THE ISSUE OF "MINERALS"
For tribes that wish to develop their fossil fuels or other
traditional energy resources such as uranium, the existing federal
statutory scheme offers fairly limitless possibilities. Tribes can enter
into standard leases under the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act
(IMLA) 2' or into virtually any kind of negotiated lease or
agreement under the 1982 Indian Mineral Development Act
(IMDA). 22 The structure of an IMDA development deal is subject
to negotiation between the tribe and the non-Indian entity, subject
only to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. Minerals
agreements under the IMDA appear to be widely and successfully
used.
20. Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act of 2005, 25
U.S.C. §§ 3501-06.
21. 25 U.S.C. § 396a-396g. Although IMLA leases are still available to tribes, they
were little used within a few years of enactment of the IMDA. See AMBLER, su/na note 2, at
241.
22. 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (authorizing tribes to "enter into any joint venture,
operating, production sharing, service, managerial, lease or other agreement" for "the




There is, however, a. definitional issue. The IMLA and IMDA
apply to mineral development. The IMDA specifies that minerals
include fossil fuels (oil, natural gas, coal), as well as other
traditional energy resources (uranium, geothermal). 3 Those
minerals named, however, are not intended to be an exclusive list.
The IMDA definition includes "other energy or non-energy
mineral resources," and the regulations for both statutes refer to
"any other energy or non-energy mineral." 24 But the potential for
mischief lies in the word "mineral."
There is no single, universally-accepted definition of what a
mineral is, although most definitions include some or all of the
following characteristics: inorganic, solid, usually crystalline,
having a definite chemical composition, and formed as a result of
geological processes.25 The International Mineralogical Association
defines a mineral as "an element or chemical compound that is
normally crystalline and that has been formed as a result of
geological processes." 26 Similarly, the Mineralogical Society of
America provides that "[a] mineral substance is defined as a
naturally occurring, homogeneous solid, inorganically formed,
with a well defined chemical composition (or range of
compositions), and an ordered atomic arrangement, that has been
formed by geological processes, either on earth or in
23. Id. ("oil, gas, uranium, coal, geothermal, or other energy or nonenergy mineral
resources (hereinafter referred to as 'mineral resources')"). The IMLA, other than
scattered references to oil.and gas as well as "other" minerals or mining, does not contain
a statutory definition.
24. The regulatory definition of minerals for purposes of leases, 25 C.F.R. § 211.3
(2011), and for minerals agreements, 25 C.F.R. § 225.3, is identical: "Minerals includes
both metalliferous and nonmetalliferous minerals; all hydrocarbons, including oil and gas,
coal and lignite of all ranks; geothermal resources; and includes but is not limited to, sand,
gravel, pumice, cinders, granite, building stone, limestone, clay, silt, or any other energy or
non-energy mineral." The regulatory definition is more expansive than the statutory
definition, including specific non-energy minerals such as sand that the statute
encompasses in "other."
25. See David Barthelmy, VWiat Is a Mineral?, WEB MINERAL, http://webmineral.com/
MineralDefinition.shtml (last visited Oct. 21, 2011) (collecting definitions of "mineral");
see also Many Definitions of Minerals, KY. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, www.uky.edu/KGS/
rocksmn/definition.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2011) (noting that "mineral" has earth
science, legal, federal, economic, and biological-medical definitions, all of which vary to
some extent).
26. Ernest H. Nickel, The Definition of a Mineral, 33 CANADIAN MINERALOGIST 689
(1995) (noting that this definition "suffices to include the vast majority of substances that
are generally accepted as minerals" and "represents a general consensus" of the IMA
Commission on New Minerals and Mineral Names).
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extraterrestrial bodies."2 1
These definitions of mineral, of course, exclude the most
common "minerals" extracted from Indian lands: oil and natural
gas. Neither, for example, is a solid or crystalline in structure.
Nonetheless, Congress has consistently been explicit that all the
fossil fuels are included within the mineral development statutes,28
and a statutory definition trumps a scientific definition for
purposes of law. Consequently, the term "mineral" in Indian law is
routinely used to include oil and natural gas.29
What, then, of the renewable energy resources-wind, solar,
and biomass? They are not crystalline in structure, they have not
been formed as a result of geological processes, and the one that is
a solid is most definitely not inorganic. Are these energy resources
"minerals" within the meaning of the IMDA?
At the time the IMDA was under consideration and drafting,
no one was thinking in terms of wind energy, solar power, or
biomass. The focus at the time was on traditional energy sources
that had routinely been considered minerals under the IMLA: oil
and gas, coal, and uranium.30 Many of the traditional energy tribes
were chafing against the bounds of the IMLA in light of the new
federal policy of tribal self-determination.3 1 As a result, the
discussion and testimony surrounding passage of the IMDA
focused on freeing the energy tribes to develop their fuel
resources in ways that would benefit the tribes to a far greater
degree than standard leasing ever did or could. There is thus no
express statutory language about renewable energy resources. And
27. See I'equently Asked Queslions, MINERALOGICAL SOCY OF AM.,
http://www.ninsocam.org/msa/collectors-corner/faq/faqmingen.htm (last visited Oct.
21, 2011).
28. 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (2006) (IMDA, expressly including oil and gas as mineral
resources); id. § 396d (IMLA, referring to "any oil, gas, or other mineral lease"); see also
Mining and Mineral Policy Act of 1970, as amended, 30 U.S.C. § 21a (2006) (defining
"minerals" to include "all minerals and mineral fuels including oil, gas, coal, oil shale and
uranium").
29. This legal expansion of science extends as well to other non-mineral resources
that Congress includes within its definitions of "mineral." Thus, for example, the IMDA
expressly includes the renewable energy resource "geothermal" as a mineral. 25 U.S.C.
§ 2102(a).
30. See AMBLER, supra note 2, at 86-87 (discussing the non-lease agreements
submitted to Interior in the years just prior to passage of the IMDA).
31. See Indian Mineral DevelopIent: Heatings on S. 1894 BJefore the S. Select Cnmn. on
Indian Affaits, 97th Cong. 33-34 (1982) [hereinafter Indian Mineral Development Ileaings]
(statement of Gilbert Harrison, Assoc. Dir. for Energy Dev., Navajo Tribe); H.R. REP. No.
97-746, at 4 (1982), prenited in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3465, 3466; AMBLER, supra note 2, at 87.
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although the legislative history and rules of statutory construction
provide clues, there is no real clarity.
First, there is essentially no discussion in the legislative history
of the IMDA about what a "mineral" is, likely because everyone
involved understood that "mineral" meant actual minerals plus
fossil fuels. Congress did include a definition of "mineral
resources" in the statute itself, a definition that tracks that
common understanding: "oil, gas, uranium, coal, geothermal, or
other energy or nonenergy mineral resources."32 From that
formulation, it appears certain that Congress intended the IMDA
to apply broadly. Both the statutory and regulatory language
includes "other energy" in the definition of minerals. Remarks by
IMDA sponsors in the Congressional Record focused on the need
for "energy" development. Senator Melcher spoke of tribal
"energy development," and he, Representative Udall, and
Representative Bereuter all commented on the need for increased
development and production of domestic energy to meet national
needs.33
Moreover, reading the IMDA broadly to apply to all energy
resources is consistent with the Indian law canons of construction.
The interpretive rules for Indian legislation mandate that statutes
be construed in favor of the Indians and that ambiguities be
resolved in favor of the tribes.34 Construing "other energy" in the
IMDA definition of minerals broadly in favor of the tribes means
that renewable energy resources such as wind, solar, and biomass
would be included. If "other energy" is ambiguous, then the
canons would require that "energy" be interpreted to include
renewable sources in addition to traditional fuel sources. Reading
the IMDA in the light most favorable to the tribes, Congress did
not intend to restrict its application to traditional minerals, but to
open up development alternatives for tribes.
On the other hand, the actual wording of the IMDA is "other
energy or nonenergy mineral resources." Although this could be
parsed as "other energy resources or other nonenergy mineral
resources," that is a far more awkward reading than the
assumption that the word "mineral" applies to both energy
32. 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a).
33. 128 CONG. REC. 29,400-01 (1982) (statement of Sen. Melcher); 128 CONG. REC.
21,333 (remarks of Rep. Udall); 128 CONG. REC. 21,334 (statement of Rep. Bereuter).
34. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw § 2.02[1] (NellJessup Newton et
al., eds., 2005).
2012] 99
100 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LA WJOURNAL
resources and nonenergy resources. When Congress intended to
include non-"minerals" within the reach of the IMDA, it specified
what those resources were. Thus, oil, natural gas, and geothermal
resources-none of which comes within the usual definitions of a
mineral-are expressly included. Given this specificity, the typical
rule of statutory construction, that the inclusion of some implies
the exclusion of all others,35 would mandate that non-"mineral"
resources not included in the statutory definition be excluded.
The Supreme Court has announced, however, that "standard
principles of statutory construction do not have their usual force in
cases involving Indian law."36 More specifically, the Court has
rejected the use of the inclusion/exclusion principle in Indian law
cases. In Bryan v. Itasca County, the state of Minnesota argued that
Public Law 280,37 providing that the "civil laws of such State"
applied in Indian country, granted the state the authority to
impose a personal property tax on a mobile home owned by tribal
members and located on trust lands.38 The state based its
argument on a second provision of Public Law 280, which stated
that nothing in that statute authorized the "taxation of real or
personal property" held in trust.39 The state-thus argued that "civil
laws" must include the general authority to tax within Indian
country, because otherwise the specific exclusion for taxation of
trust property had no meaning. 40 Under the state's approach, the
state could tax non-trust personal property (such as the mobile
home) because Public Law 280 excluded only taxation of trust
property. The Court unanimously rejected the state's approach.
Noting that the statute was ambiguous, the Court stated that "we
must be guided" by the Indian law canons of construction and
resolve the statutory ambiguity in favor of the Indians."
As strong as the preference for the Indian law canons of
construction may be, however, the Supreme Court has not
35. Or, for those who prefer Latin, inchsio uinus est exclusio alteirius.
36. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985).
37. Public Law 280 granted civil jurisdiction over Indian country to certain states,
including Minnesota. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (2006).
38. Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1976). The Court ultimately held that
Public Law 280's grant of civil jurisdiction did not include regulatory laws such as taxes. Id.
at 390.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b).
40. ihyan, 426 U.S. at 378-79.
41. Id.at392.
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hesitated to abandon these canons when it suits. 4 2 As a result, while
the IMDA perhaps should be interpreted broadly to apply to energy
resources as well as traditional minerals and fossil fuels, an
interpretation favoring Indian tribes is by no means guaranteed.
Thus, whether the IMDA would apply to non-"mineral" energy
resources-that is, renewables other than geothermal-is
uncertain. And uncertainty impedes development.43
A good illustration of the problem that uncertainty creates is
the situation that led to passage of the IMDA itself. Tribes chafing
under the IMLA restrictions in the 1970s began to negotiate non-
lease development deals, and between 1975 and 1980, the
Secretary of the Interior approved a number of these deals, relying
either on the tribe's authority to contract or on the theory that
modem mineral "leases" needed to include more than the
standard IM[A lease form.44 In essence, Interior began to define
"lease" in broad terms. As more and more tribes submitted
negotiated agreements, however, Interior became increasingly
ambivalent about its role.45 An Assistant Secretary for Indian
Affairs noted that "the most serious [problem with using the IMLA
42. Perhaps the strangest example is County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands
of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992). The county leveled its ad valorem property
tax on fee lands within the reservation owned by the tribe and its members, and the tribe
argued that state taxes on Indian property were not permissible without clear
congressional intent. Without mention of the Indian law canons of construction, the Court
concluded that the General Allotment Act authorized state taxation of the fee lands, even
though the statute expressly allowed taxation only for certain types of fee lands that were
not at issue in the case. Id. at 258-59. The Court then addressed the issue of whether the
state could also impose its excise tax on the sale of Indian-owned fee land, and concluded
that the state could not do so. The statute authorized taxation of "land" and, applying the
canon of liberal interpretation in favor of the Indians, a tax on the sale of land was not a
tax on the land itself, and therefore was not authorized by Congress. Id. at 268-70. In
regard to the excise tax, the Court stated that "[w]hen we are faced with ... two possible
constructions, our choice between them must be dictated by a principle deeply rooted in
this Court's Indian jurisprudence: '[S]tatutes are to be construed liberally in favor the
Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit."' Id. at 269. The Court
thus declined to cite, much less employ, the canons to determine whether the fee lands
were taxable, but found the canons indispensable in determining whether the sale of the
same lands would be subject to taxation.
43. See AMBLER, supra note 2, at 87 (noting that the uncertainty surrounding non-
lease agreements in the years leading up to the IMDA "penalized the companies that were
willing to work with tribes" and led some to break off negotiations).
44. See Indian Mineral Development Hearings, surna note 31, at 4.
45. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-746, at 4-5 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3465, 3467;
Tim Vollmann, Exploration and Development Agreements on Indian Lands, 50 ROCKY MTN.
MINERAL L. INsr. 12-1, 12-13 (2004) ("The question of the continuing validity of these
agreements became the driving force behind the enactment of the IMDA in 1982.").
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as authority] is that it authorized development of tribal oil and gas
resources only by leasing," and not by other types of ventures. 6 He
added that the use of a tribal contracting statute47 was also
"inadequate," and concluded that "there is a question whether we
have adequate authority to approve those nonlease ventures even
by utilizing both acts."48 That uncertainty led the Interior Solicitor
to question the approval of non-lease agreements in 1980,19
throwing the validity of existing approved agreements into doubt.
It took passage of the IMDA in 1982 to resolve the issue of tribal
authority to use non-lease options for mineral development.
The IMDA was a clear "fix," and it effectively grandfathered in
the existing approved agreements. 50 The same thing could happen
if the Secretary of the Interior were to treat solar power, say, as a
mineral under.the IMDA. But just as Interior became squeamish
about its approach to non-lease arrangements in 1980, so Interior
could react squeamishly to treating sunlight as a mineral. If that
were to happen, Congress would undoubtedly enact a legislative
fix (such as the IMDA for non-leases), and existing agreements
would tindoubtedly be grandfathered in. But the period of
uncertainty between Interior's doubts and congressional action is a
wasted period. It is wasted time for Indian tribes, their non-Indian
partners, and domestic energy production. It is much more
preferable to have appropriate legislation in place before deals are
struck, removing a potential impediment to renewable energy
development.
46. Indian Minea lDevelonment Ilearings, supra note 31, at 71 (statement of Kenneth L.
Smith, Asst. Sec. for Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior).
47. 25 U.S.C. § 81 (2006). At the time the IMDA was under consideration, § 81
applied to contracts for "services for said Indians relative to their lands." 25 U.S.C. § 81
(1982) (amended 2000). See Act of May 21, 1872, 17 Stat. 136, amended /Y Pub. L. No. 85-
770, 72 Stat. 927 (1958). The current version, which authorizes contracts and agreements
that encumber Indian lands, subject to secretarial approval if the instrument is for seven
years or longer, was enacted in 2000. Pub. L. No. 106-179, § 2, 114 Stat. 46 (2000). For
discussion of§ 81, see infia Part III.A.2.
48. Indian Mineral Develofunent Ileafings, supra note 31, at 71 (statement of Kenneth L.
Smith, Asst. Sec. for Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior).
49. See id. at 72 (statement of Tim Vollman, Solicitor's Office, Department of the
Interior); see alsoAMBLER, su/na note 2, at 87.
50. 25 U.S.C. § 2104(a) (treating as valid any existing approved agreement that
complied with, or could be brought into compliance with, the pLrposes of the IMDA).
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III. THE RANGE OF STATUTORY OPTIONS FOR RENEWABLES
DEVELOPMENT
If the IMDA is not available as a development tool for most
renewable energy resources, what then can tribes use? There are a
number of statutes not designed specifically for energy
development that nonetheless may provide authority for particular
types of renewable energy resources. For the most part, however,
these statutes force tribes into a passive role regarding energy
development, putting tribes back into the position they occupied
with respect to mineral development prior to passage of the IMDA.
In the same way that the lease-only option under the IMLA proved
too confining for tribes in a self-determination era, so too will the
constraints of the available statutes discussed here.
A. Solar and Wind Power
1. Indian Long-Term Leasing Act
Certain types of renewable energy development-solar and
wind-involve the surface use of tribal land for the placement of
solar panels or wind turbines. The Indian Long-Term Leasing Act,
also known as § 415, authorizes tribes to lease the surface of their
lands for virtually any "business" use.51 Lease terms are sufficiently
long to justify investment by lessees: the standard § 415 lease term
is 25 years with an option to renew for an additional 25 years, and
more than 40 named tribes are authorized to enter into 99-year
leases.52 Section 415 leases have been employed for everything
51. Id. § 415 (authorizing land leases "for public, religious, educational, recreational,
residential, or business purposes, including the development or utilization of natural
resources in connection with operations under such leases, for grazing purposes, and for
those farming purposes which require the making of a substantial investment in the
improvement of the land for the production of specialized crops as determined by said
Secretary"). Forestry and most agriculture, as described subsequently in the text, have
separate statutory authority.
52. Id. Leases for ninety-nine years have serious potential problems. See Discussion
Draft of the Indian Energy Promotion and Parity Act of 2010, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 111th Cong. 10 (2010) [hereinafter Discussion Draft Hearing] (statement of
the National Congress of American Indians) ("[C]ertain 99-year leases can amount to a de
facto sale of tribal land (for example, non-Indian residential housing). Historic experience
has shown that it is very difficult for a tribe to recover its property once a non-Indian
residential community is established."). Despite such misgivings, Indian energy legislation
introduced in 2010 would have extended ninety-nine year leasing authority to all tribes, as
well as permitting tribes with corporate charters to issue ninety-nine year leases without
secretarial approval. See Indian Energy Parity Act of 2010, S. 3752, 111th Cong. § 301(c),
(f) (2010), discussed infra Part V.B. For discussion of leasing authority of tribes with
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from billboards53 to such energy-related projects as liquefied
natural gas terminals 54  and oil production facilities.55  The
construction and operation of solar and wind facilities on tribal
lands are thus well within the purview of § 415.. New § 415
regulations proposed in late November 2011 would make this
explicit.56
The primary drawback of § 415 is that it authorizes leases only,
and only those leases approved by the Secretary.57 Surface leases
are negotiated between the parties, and thus may include terms
beneficial to the tribal lessor. But nonetheless, tribes are restricted
to the passive role of lessor, the same restriction under the IMLA
that tribes rebelled against in the modern era.
2. Section 81 Contracts Encumbering Indian Lands
Section 81 provides that an Indian tribe may enter into a
contract or agreement that "encumbers Indian lands,"5 8 although
it applies only if other statutory authority does not. Thus, § 81 does
not apply to mineral leases, minerals agreements, agricultural
leases, timber contracts, or surface leases.5 9 Nonetheless, it does
corporate charters, see inifa Part III.C.
53. People ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Naegele Outdoor Advers. Co., 698 P.2d 150, 152
(Cal. 1985).
54. Nulankeyttmonen Nkihtaqmikon v. Impson, 503 F.3d 18, 23-24 (1st Cir. 2007).
55. Oenga v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 427, 428 (2007).
56. Noting that the existing § 415 regulations are fifty years old and "take an
antiquated, 'one-size fits all' approach," DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS, SIGNIFICANT LEASING REFORM WILL SPUR COMMERCIAL, RESIDENTIAL AND
RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON INDIAN LANDS (Nov. 28, 2011), available at
http://www.bia.gov/idc/grouIps/pulblic/docurments/text/idc015725.pdf, the Department
of the Interior proposed to create new regulatory subparts for residential leases, business
leases, and wind energy evaluation leases and wind and solar resource leases. Residential,
Business, and Wind and Solar Resource Leases on Indian Land, 76 Fed. Reg. 73,784 (Nov.
29, 2011). The new regulations for business leases would expressly apply to biomass
development. Id. at 73,805 (proposed § 162.401(a) (4)). Interior anticipates that the final
rule will be published in 2012.
57. A few specifically-named tribes have the authority to grant § 415 leases for fifteen
years withotIt an option to renew, without secretarial approval. Excepted from this process,
however, is any lease "for the exploitation of any natural resource." 25 U.S.C. § 415(b)
(2006) (specifying Tulalip Tribes, Puyallup Tribe, Swinomish Indian Tribal Community,
and Kalispel Tribe, all in Washington State).
58. 25 U.S.C. § 81(b) ("No agreement or contract with an Indian tribe that
encumbers Indian lands for a period of 7 or more years shall be valid Unless that
agreement or contract bears the approval of the Secretary of the Interior or a designee of
the Secretary.").
59. 25 C.F.R. § 84.004(a)-(b) (2011).
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have some application for renewable energy projects.
According to Department of the Interior regulations, a
contract or agreement "encumbers Indian lands" if it "attach[es]
a claim, lien, charge, right of entry or liability to real property."60
As clarified by the courts, an encumbrance occurs when a contract
or agreement "by its terms, provides a third party with a legal
interest in the land itself; that is, a right or claim attached to the
real property that would interfere with the tribe's exclusive
proprietary control over the land." 61 By the plain terms of the
regulations and the meaning of encumbrance, an easement is thus
a contract or agreement that encumbers Indian lands.62
An easement for wind turbines or solar panels is an alternative
to a lease of the land itself.63 In some ways, an easement may be
preferable, because it permits the tribe as servient estate holder
the continued right to use the land for purposes not inconsistent
with the easement.6" Thus, for example, the tribe could use a wind
farm corridor for grazing or agricultural uses once the wind
60. Id. g 84.002.
61. GasPlus, L.L.C. v. Dep't of the Interior, 510 F. Supp. 2d 18, 29 (D.D.C. 2007).
The focus is on transferring proprietary control, but not ownership, to a third party. Id. at
30 (referencing the legislative history); 25 C.F.R. § 84.002; see also Business Development on
Indian Lands: Hearing on S. 613 and S. 614 Before the S. Comm on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong.
44 (1999) [hereinafter Business Development Hearing] (testimony of David Tovey, Exec. Dir.,
Confederated Tribes of the. Umatilla Indian Reservation) (urging that § 81 approval be
required only "for tribal agreements that involve a contracting party receiving some
possessory interest in tribal lands, such as an easement or license").
62. 25 C.F.R. § 84.002. This is consistent with the well-understood legal meaning of
the term "encumbrance." See, eg., GasPlus, 510 F. Supp. 2d at 28; see alsoJOSEPH WILLIAM
SINGER, INTRODUcTION TO PROPERTY 170 (2001) (holding that an easement grants specific
limited rights in land).
63. See Alternative Energy and Alternate Usage of Existing Facilities on the Outer
Continental Shelf, 73 Fed. Reg. 39,376, 39,407 (July 9, 2008) (noting that both leases and
easements are "common arrangement[s]" for wind farms on private lands); Ernest E.
Smith & Becky. H. Diffen, Winds of Change: The Creation of Wind Law, 5 TEx. J. OIL GAS &
ENERGY L. 165, 166 (2009-10) (noting "hundreds of thousands of easements, wind leases,
and other types of development rights" for wind farms on non-Indian lands). See generally
Kathleen K. Law, Wind Power: Developing Real Property for a Wind Project, 23 PROB. & PROP. 57
(2009) (discussing common provisions of easements for wind farms).
64. New proposed regulations for surface leases would expressly allow for similar
uses. The proposed regulations state that a biomass, wind, or solar lease "may provide for
the Indian landowner to use, or authorize others to use, the leased premises for other
uses" that are compatible and consistent with the energy lease. Residential, Business, and
Wind and Solar Resource Leases on Indian Land, 76 Fed. Reg. 73,784, 73,807 (proposed
§ 162.418) (business leases, including biomass), 73,820 (proposed § 162.544) (wind and
solar leases) (Nov. 29, 2011).
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turbines were constructed and operational.65 In addition,
agreements encumbering Indian lands for a term less than seven
years do not require secretarial approval, 66 eliminating a time-
consuming and often cumbersome step in Indian lands
development. This advantage is offset, however, by the fact that
seven years is likely not sufficient time for a wind developer to risk
investing in a project on Indian lands. Wind farm easements tend
to run for twenty-five to thirty years,'' a term which would require
secretarial approval. 68
Nonetheless, easements are potentially more problematic for
tribes than leases. An easement is, like a right-of-way, a servitude in
land.69 Although servitudes do not transfer ownership of the land
itself, federal courts have repeatedly found that tribes retain only
limited authority over non-tribal members on rights-of-way across
Indian lands.
In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, a nonmember sued another
nonmember in tribal court over an accident that occurred on a
state highway through the reservation.70 The U.S. Supreme Court
held that the tribes "expressly reserved no right to exercise
dominion or control over the right-of-way;" they had "retained no
gatekeeping right."" As a result, the Court stated, the tribes had
given up their inherent right to exclude nonmembers from the
65. See, e.g., Law, supna note 63, at 60 (noting that "[m]any wind projects are placed
on agricultural land," but that crop damage is a common occurrence during the
construction phase).
66. 25 U.S.C. § 81(b) (2006).
67. See, e.g., Law, supna note 63, at 59.
68. See 25 U.S.C. § 81(b), (d); see also 25 C.F.R. § 84.006 (2011) (requiring that if
secretarial approval is required, the Secretary will disapprove a contract or agreement that
violates federal law or does not make provision regarding tribal sovereign immunity; the
Secretary will also consult with the tribe prior to disapproving a contract or agreement).
69. See SINGER, supa note 62, at 170-71. Two statutes govern rights-of-way across
tribal lands. Under the Indian Right-of-Way Act of 1948, rights-of-way may be granted "for
all purposes." 25 U.S.C. § 323; see also 25 C.F.R. pt. 169. Some of these rights-of-way are
limited to fifty-year terms, but most energy-related rights-of-way such as oil and gas
pipelines and electric transmission lines may be granted "without limitation as to term of
years." 25 C.F.R. § 169.18. Tribes granting rights-of-way for oil and gas pipelines may
choose instead to use a 1904 statute, ch. 505, §§ 1, 2, 33 Stat. 65 (1904) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 321), the regulations for which limit the right-of-way term to
twenty years. 33 Fed. Reg. 19803 (Dec. 27, 1968) (codified at 25 C.F.R. § 169.25(b)); see
also Blackfeet Indian Tribe v. Mont. Power Co., 838 F.2d 1055, 1059 (9th Cir. 1988)
(holding that the general 1948 Act did not repeal the 1904 oil and gas pipeline statute,
and thus tribes could choose which statute to use for oil and gas pipelines).
70. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
71. Id. at455-56.
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encumbered lands.72 By ceding the right to exclude, the tribes had
also given up the lesser right to exercise governmental authority
over the nonmembers on the highway unless the tribes could
demonstrate either nonmember consent to tribal jurisdiction or
nonmember impacts on tribal health, safety, economic integrity, or
political security.73 In Strate, the Court determined that neither
consent nor sufficient impacts on the tribe were present, and thus
that the tort action could not be heard in tribal court. 7
Lower federal courts have subsequently extended this
approach to a tribe's ability to tax and regulate holders of rights-of-
way on Indian lands, spurning tribal attempts to impose property
taxes.75 These courts have determined that although the non-
Indian parties holding the rights-of-way had formed a consent
relationship with the tribe, they had consented to taxes only on
their activities, not taxes on their property interests. 76 In addition,
the courts have generally rejected the tribes' argument that the
ability to tax right-of-way holders is necessary to protect the tribes'
governmental interests in health, welfare, or economic security.77
72. Id. at 456.
73. The requirement that tribes show either nonmember consent or "direct effect
on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health an welfare of the tribe" in
order to exercise governmental authority over nonmembers traces to Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981). Although the requirement was designed to apply to
nonmembers on fee lands only, id., the Court in Strate determined that the state highway
was the jurisdictional equivalent of fee land because the tribes retained no property
owner's right to exclude the nonmembers. Strate, 520 U.S. at 456.
74. Strate, 520 U.S. at 456-59. Lower courts have followed suit, holding that tribal
courts do not have jurisdiction over tort actions against nonmember defendants for causes
of action arising on rights-of-way. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d L059,
1063 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he Tribe had no reserved power to exclude the Railroad from
the reservation, nor to exercise dominion or control over the right-of-way."); cf McDonald
v. Means, 309 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 2002) (refusing to extend Strate to a Bureau of Indian
Affairs highway right-of-way, and noting that the tribe retained significant gatekeeping
rights in the BIA roadway).
75. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. v. Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck
Reservation, 323 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2003) (ad valorem tax on railroad right-of-way); Big
Horn Cnty. Elec. Coop. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2000) (ad valorem tax on utility
right-of-way).
76. Burlington N., 323 F.3d at 772; Big Horn, 219 F.3d at 951. In Montana, the
Supreme Court had stated that: "A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or
other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the
tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements." 450 U.S. at 565. The lower courts focused their analysis on a narrow
reading of the word "activities," ignoring the broader principle that those who enter into
arrangements such as rights-of-way with Indian tribes consent to the exercise of tribal
jurisdiction.
77. Big Horn, 219 F.3d at 951; see albo Burlington N., 323 F.3d at 773-74 (remanding to
STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LA WJOURNAL
This restrictive view of tribal governmental authority over
nonmember rights-of-way stands in stark contrast to the approach
to tribal governmental authority over nonmember lessees. In
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed
that Indian tribes retain the inherent power to tax, and that the
power to tax is not affected by a lease.78 The tribe's power to tax
nonmembers, the Court held, does not derive solely from its power
to exclude "them, but rather from its inherent. power as a
sovereign.79 When a tribe enters into a lease, the Court explained,
it gives up its landowner's right to exclude the lessee for the lease
term, subject to the conditions in the lease, and the right to
unilaterally impose new business conditions. The tribe does not,
however, give up its right to act as a sovereign unless restrictions
on governmental authority are expressly set forth in the lease
itself.80 In particular, the Court rejected the notion that a tribe
must expressly reserve its sovereign powers in a contract in order
to preserve them.8 Thus, the Court held, the tribe retained the
governmental authority to impose severance taxes on its oil and
gas lessees.
* The federal courts have thus taken very different approaches to
tribal authority over nonmembers who lease tribal lands and
nonmembers who hold rights-of-way across tribal lands. The Court
has not, however, ruled on tribal governmental authority over
easement holders. If an easement is used as an alternative to a
lease-the case with wind farms, for example-then federal courts
should find that tribal authority over easement holders mirrors
tribal authority over lessees. But if the federal courts' approach to
tribal authority over rights-of-way extends to all servitudes,
including easements, then Indian tribes considering a § 81
easement for wind turbines might be better advised to enter into a
§ 415 lease, or at least to carefully draft any easement to ensure
that the tribe grants only property rights to the easement holder
and expressly retains all governmental authority.
In addition to the potential for restricted tribal authority over
an easement holder, an easement under § 81 shares some of the
determine whether railroad's activities had sufficient effects on these tribal governmental
interests).
78. Merrion v.Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1982).
79. Id. at 141.
80. Id. at 144-46.
81. Id. at 146, 148.
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drawbacks of a lease under § 415, particularly if the easement is for
seven years or longer and thus requires secretarial approval.
Easements, like surface leases, are subject to negotiation between
the parties, but the tribe remains in an essentially passive role in
the development of the renewable energy resources. It is the
servient estate holder rather than the lessor, and thus may
negotiate greater rights to use the land subject to the easement,
but its role in the energy development project remains limited.
B. Biomass Resources
Biomass consists of certain plant matter and other organic
materials that can be converted to energy. The National
Renewable Energy Laboratory defines biomass as primarily wood,
but also including "food crops, grassy and woody plants, residues
from agriculture or forestry, oil-rich algae, and the organic
component of municipal and industrial wastes." 82 The
development of this biomass feedstock-the raw materials of
biomass energy production-implicates additional federal
statutes.
1. National Indian Forest Resource Management Act
One source of biomass feedstock is forest residue.83 Prior to
passage of the National Indian Forest Resource Management Act
(NIFRMA) 8 4 in 1990, the economic potential of Indian forest lands
lay in timber, with timber sales governed by a 1910 statute. 5 The
1990 NIFRMA, however, broadened the approach from timber to
"forest products" in a deliberate effort to ensure that tribes
received the widest economic return from their forest resources. 86
82. Learning About Renewable Energy, U.S. NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB.,
http://www.nrel.gov/learning/rebiomass.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2011); see aho Guide to
Tribal Energy Development: Biomass Energy Resources, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/tribalenergy/guide/biomass.html (last visited Oct. 21,
2011) (detailing potential sources of biomass).
83. Forest residue can include "logging and mill residues, and other removal (pre-
commercial thinnings, land clearing, timber stand improvements, etc.)." Energy
Consumption, supra note 8, at 21.
84. National Indian Forest Resource Management Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3101-20 (2006).
85. Id. § 407 (authorizing the Secretary to sell timber on unallotted trust lands).
86. See 25 C.F.R. § 163.3(b) (4) (2011) (noting that one objective of NIFRMA is to
ensure "that Indians may receive from their Indian forest land not only stumpage value,
but also the benefit of all the labor and profit that such Indian forest land is capable of
yielding").
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The term forest products is defined not only as traditional timber
and timber products, but also such items as nuts, roots, berries,
Christmas trees, and "other marketable material."87 To the extent
that forest residue-what remains after timber production-is
marketable as biomass feedstock, NIFRMA would apply.
Under NIFRMA, forest products may be sold on the open
market with the consent of the Secretary and the tribe.88 Any sale
of forest products with a stumpage value exceeding $15,000 must
use federally approved contract forms,89 and the harvester has no
more than five years to complete the contract.90 Forest products
not subject to sales contracts may be harvested under permits with
the consent of the Indian owner and the approval of the
Secretary.9'
As with other statutes available for renewable energy
development, NIFRMA takes tribes out of an active role in
developing biomass energy. The tribe is the seller of the forest
products, with no opportunity to enter into joint ventures or other
arrangements with non-Indian harvesters.
2. American Indian Agricultural Resources Management Act
Another source of biomass feedstock is crop residues or even
crops grown specifically for feedstock purposes. Native grasses, for
example, may be grown as wildlife habitat and harvested on an
appropriate periodic schedule for use in biomass energy
production.92 While tribes are likely to carry out most native grass
planting for feedstock "in-house," the majority of tribal croplands
are leased.93 Thus, if a non-Indian entity undertakes the feedstock
87. 25 U.S.C. § 3103(6); see also25 C.F.R. § 163.1.
88. 25 C.F.R. § 163.14(a). In general, sales must be advertised, although the
advertisement may limit sales to tribal members or to Indian forest enterprises. Id.
§ 163.15(a) (2011).
89. Id. § 163.19(a) (noting that special forms may also be approved).
90. Id. § 163.24 (specifying the maximum time "for harvesting the estimated volume
of timber purchased" on a *forest product contract").
91. Id. § 163.26(a). Free use permits may be issued for forest products valued at
$5000 or less, and the forest products may not then be sold: Id. § 163.26(b). Paid permits
may be issued for values not to exceed $25,000. Id. § 163.26(c). Indians may, with consent
of the Indian owner and the Secretary, harvest forest products for personal use without a
permit or a contract. Id. § 163.27.
92. See The New Eneqg 1uture in Indian Counity, supra note 16, at 12.
93. HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE STATE
OF THE NATIVE NATIONS: CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION 167
(2008) (estimating that 70% of Indian croplands are leased to non-Indians).
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project, or if the feedstock consists of residues from agricultural
leases, then the American Indian Agricultural Resources
Management Act (AIARMA)94 of 1993 comes into play.
Under ALARMA, an Indian tribe may lease its land for
agricultural purposes for terms of up to ten years, or twenty-five
years if the longer term is in the best interest of the tribe and the
lease requires a substantial investment by the lessee.95 Agricultural
leases may.not, however, be renewed.96 As with § 415 surface leases,
agricultural leases may be negotiated by the landowner, but are
ultimately subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.97
In addition, as with § 415 surface leases, AIARMA puts tribes in the
position of lessors only, without provision for other types of
agreements and arrangements that might better suit modern tribal
realities. Moreover, lease terms are relatively short, and without the
option of renewal, the time limitation may suppress non-Indian
investment.
C. Indian Reorganization Act
Under section 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of
1934, any Indian tribe may petition the Secretary of the Interior
for a corporate charter.98 A section 17 charter empowers the tribal
corporation to "manage, operate, and dispose of property" of all
kinds, as well as grants "such further powers as may be incidental
to the conduct of corporate business, not inconsistent with law." A
corporate charter may not, however, authorize the corporation to
sell or mortgage trust property within a reservation, or to lease
property for a term greater than twenty-five years.
Although it is difficult to determine how many tribes hold
94. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3701-45 (2006).
95. Id. § 3715(a)(1). Agricultural leases and permits must comply with the provisions
of agricultural resource management plans developed by the tribe or by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs in conjunction with the tribe. Id. § 3711; 25 C.F.R. § 162.201 (2011); see aho
id. § 162.231(b).
96. 25 C.F.R. §162.229(d).
97. Id. §§ 162.206-.207. Agricultural permits for tribal lands operate under the same
regulations. Id. § 162.210(c). Proposed regulatory changes to the surface leasing provisions
would make only minor, technical changes to the agricultural leasing regulations.
Residential, Business, and Wind and Solar Resource Leases on Indian Land, 76 Fed. Reg.
73,784, 73,795 (Nov. 29, 2011).
98. 25 C.F.R. § 477. The process of obtaining a corporate charter can be
"cumbersome." COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 34, at § 21.02[1][b] (describing the
process); see abo 25 C.F.R. pt. 81.
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section 17 corporate charters,9 those that do may use their leasing
authority for renewable energy projects. 00 A lease granted under
section 17 has advantages over leases under other statutes. The
approval of the Secretary of the Interior is not required, and the
lease term is long enough to attract non-Indian investment.
However, a lease granted by an IRA corporation is still a lease,
leaving the tribe in the essentially passive role of lessor.
Absent language in a specific charter, it is not clear whether a
section 17 corporation has the authority to encumber Indian lands
by other than a lease: whether, for example, a section 17
corporation could grant an easement for the development of a
wind farm. On the one hand, the IRA authorizes such corporations
to "manage, operate, and dispose of" tribal interests in property,
which would appear to grant broader authority than just the right
to issue leases. On the other hand, the only authorized
encumbrances in section 17 are leases; this statutory specificity
could be interpreted as restricting the corporations to grant only
those instruments.10 In any event, a section 17 corporation's
ability to grant an easement is uncertain and, as noted earlier,
uncertainty impedes development.
D. Problems with the Existing Statutory Options
The non-minerals statutes that might be used for renewable
energy development share a pair of significant disadvantages. First,
like the minerals statutes, they generally require the approval of
the Secretary of the Interior for each development deal. And
99. According to one source, at least 157 Indian tribes, including 66 in Alaska, have
corporate charters, although the information seems limited largely to those charters issued
in the 1930s and 1940s. See Indian Rerganization Act Era Constitutions and Chaters, UNIV. OF
OKLA. LAW CTR., http://thorpe.ou.edu/IRA.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2011).
100. Section 17 corporations may use their leasing authority for traditional energy
sources as well. The Indian Mineral Leasing Act preserves the leasing rights of section 17
corporations, 25 U.S.C. § 396b (2006), and IMLA leasing rights remain unaffected by the
Indian Mineral Development Act. Id. § ?105. Corporate leasing authority was little used for
mining, however. Prior to 1990, the maximum lease term a section 17 corporation could
authorize was only ten years; by the time section 17 was amended to allow for twenty-five
year leases, Pub. L. No. 101-301, § 3(c), 104 Stat. 207 (1990), mineral tribes were generally
using IMDA minerals agreements rather than leases. See To Pertnit Indian Tribes to Enter into
Certaiii Agieeiments for the Disposition of Tiibal Mineral Resouiices: Ilearingv on S. 1894 Befoie the S.
Select Coinn. oi hidian Affairs, 97th Cong. 62-63 (1982) (statement ofJoe McKay, Blackfeet
Tribe of Mont.).
101. Even though the statutory principle of interpretation that items not listed are
excluded has little force in Indian law, see supa text accompanying notes 35-41, a grant of
the right to issue one specific type of encumbrance is not necessarily ambiguous.
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second, they restrict Indian tribes to a passive role in the
development of tribal renewable resources.
Almost all of the nonminerals statutes require the approval of
the Secretary of the Interior for the specific lease, agreement, or
sale. 02 Just as the Secretary must approve all IMLA leases and all
IMDA agreements for traditional mineral development,103 the
Secretary must also approve all § 415 leases,10 4 all easements lasting
seven years or longer, 05 all open-market sales of forest products, 06
and all agricultural leases. 0 7
This instrument-by-instrument approval process introduces
both delay and potential federal override of tribal decisions. First,
the process itself is time-consuming. Federal approval may take
years,108 potentially inflating the costs of a project as well as
increasing the likelihood that non-Indian partners and investors
will look elsewhere. 09 Second, in exercising the approval power,
102. The exceptions are short-term easements granted under 25 U.S.C. § 81 and
leases granted by section 17 tribal corporations.
103. 25 U.S.C. § 396a (IMLA leases); id. § 2102(a) (IMDA minerals agreements).
104. Id. § 415(a).
105. Id. § 81(b).
106. 25 C.F.R. § 163.14 (2011).
107. 25 U.S.C. § 3715(a) (2006).
108. See, e.g., Tribal Development Hearing, supra note 1, at 8 (statement of Tex G. Hall,
Chairman, Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation of the Fort Berthold Reservation) (noting
the Department's "49-step process" for approval of tribal oil and gas leases that "can take
as long as two (2) years to complete"); Tribal Development Hearing, supra note 1, at 8
(written testimony of Marcus D. Well, Jr., Chairman, Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort
Berthold Reservation) (noting that secretarial approval of the tribe's IMDA agreements
took "over three years"); id. at 18 (testimony of Carl Venne, Chairman , Crow Nation)
(noting "an extremely slow BIA approval process"). Proposed regulations for surface
leases would address this problem in part by providing that Interior has sixty days to
approve or disapprove a lease, or return it for revision, or request additional time. If
Interior requests additional review time, it must identify its concerns and offer the
opportunity to respond. Residential, Business, and Wind and Solar Resource Leases on
Indian Land, 76 Fed. Reg. 73,784, 73,809 (proposed 25 C.F.R. § 162.439(b)) (business
leases, including biomass), 73,823 (proposed 25 C.F.R. § 162.564(b)) (wind and solar
leases) (Nov. 29, 2011). If Interior fails to meet the deadlines, the parties may appeal
under the provisions of 25 C.F.R. pt. 2.
109. See, e.g., Discussion Draft Hearing, supra note 52, at 39 (testimony of Clipper
Windpower) (noting that the lack of clarity in leasing Indian lands makes "it more
attractive to invest precious capital" outside Indian country); Indian Energy Heaing, supira
note 13, at 32 (prepared statement of Hon. James Roan Gray, Chairman, Indian Country
Renewable Energy Consortium Board of Directors)
(Investors, developers and Tribes who seek to invest capital on renewable
projects are finding that the lack of clarity with respect to trust and Indian land
lease reviews and permitting, and the often severe delays and extraordinary and
unpredictable length of time involved in such federal reviews and the federal
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the Secretary is generally obligfited to determine whether the
proposed lease, agreement, or sale is "in the best interest of" the
Indian tribe." 0 The determination of best interest involves an
exercise of the trust responsibility on the one hand and federal
paternalism on the other. While the approval process may have
saved more than one tribe from an improvident deal,"' it also
allows the federal government to override a tribe's determination
of tribal needs and priorities. In the current era of tribal self-
determination and increased tribal sophistication in negotiating
with energy companies, federal disapproval of proposed energy
deals may be rare,"12 but the potential nonetheless exists for the
federal government to reject a deal that a tribe has chosen to
undertake. Thus, even where the Secretary is obligated to defer to
tribal choices, that deference is tempered by the federal oversight
responsibility." 3
The second major disadvantage with the approaches discussed
in this Section is that none allows Indian tribes to take on the
active role in development that is authorized in IMDA minerals
agreements. As noted earlier, tribes using the IMDA for mineral
issuance of permits, serve as a great disincentive to capital deployment.");
Business Development Ileating, supnra note 61, at 43 (testimony of David Tovey, Exec. Dir.,
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation) ("In many commercial settings,
time is of the essence and a prolonged period of federal agency review of documents can
increase transaction costs or even render a project infeasible.").
110. See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. § 162.107(a) (2011) (surface leases); id. § 162.214(a)
(agricultural leases); see also 25 U.S.C. § 2103(b) (IMDA minerals agreements); c{ 25
C.F.R. § 84.006(a) (stating that the Secretary will disapprove a § 81 agreement only if it
violates federal law or fails to provide for remedies upon breach or waive tribal sovereign
immunity).
Ill. See, e.g., Sangre de Cristo Dev. Co. v. United States, 932 F.2d 891 (10th Cir.
1991) (noting that at request of tribe, Secretary rescinded prior approval of lease based on
environmental concerns discovered during mandated environmental review period);
Quantum Exploration, Inc. v. Clark, 780 F.2d 1457 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that while
negotiated mineral agreement was pending before Secretary, tribal council rescinded its
approval after constultation with Bureau of Indian Affairs).
112. See, e.g., Business DeveloYpmen Ileating, supra note 61, at 31 (statement of Michael
J. Anderson, Dep. Assist. Sec'y of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior) ("We do not
believe that it is appropriate for the BIA to be second guessing the decisions of tribes and
their consultants over business decisions made by the tribes.").
113. See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. § 162.107(a) (agricultural and other surface leases) ("In
reviewing a negotiated lease for approval, we will defer to the landowners' determination
that the lease is in their best interest, to the maximum extent possible.") (emphasis added).
Proposed regulatory changes for surface leasing preserve this language. Residential,
Business, and Wind and Solar Resource Leases on Indian Land, 76 Fed. Reg. 73,784,
73,809 (proposed 25 C.F.R. § 162.439(a)(5)) (business leases, including biomass), 73,822-
23 (proposed 25 C.F.R. § 162.564(a) (5)) (wind and solar leases) (Nov. 29, 2011).
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development may enter into negotiated leases or "any joint
venture, operating, production sharing, service, managerial... or
other agreement" with a non-Indian company.114 Tribes may
choose any role that best suits their needs, from the relatively
passive lessor through the partnership of a joint venture to a
service contract in which the tribe merely hires a company to
perform the mining activities.115 Moreover, tribes are not confined
to the types of agreements listed in the IMDA," 6 and many
minerals agreements have been hybrid arrangements." 7
By contrast, as noted throughout the discussion above, none of
the nonminerals statutes envisions an active tribal role in
development. Tribes may either bypass the statutes altogether and
develop their renewable energy resources themselves, or serve as
lessors, servient estate holders, or sellers." 8 Unlike the IMDA,
none of these statutes provides for the vast middle ground of tribal
partnerships with non-Indian energy companies. And that vast
middle ground is crucial. Tribes with some ownership component
in energy projects not only retain a more significant say in the
project itself, but may realize greater revenues, increased
professional opportunities for tribal members, and the ability to
"create a management team with a long-term stake in the
community."119
114. 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (2006).
115. For more detailed descriptions of minerals agreement options, see AMBLER,
sufna note 2, at 241-43; Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country: The
Evolution of Tribal Control over Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA L.J. 541, 586-87 (1994).
116. See 25 C.F.R. § 225.21(b) ("No particular form of minerals agreement is
prescribed.").
117. See AMBLER, supra note 2, at 242.
118. See Tribal Development Hearing, supra note 1, at 54 (statement of Michael L.
Connolly, President, Laguna Resource Services, Inc.) (noting that the role of lessor is "the
relationship that offers the lowest value for the tribal community and represents, sadly, a
repeat of the historical method of resource removal and exploitation that tribes have
fought so hard to overcome."). Proposed regulatory changes for surface leasing would
offer some expanded possibilities to tribal lessors. Leases for biomass, wind, and solar
purposes would specify ownership of improvements, and could provide that improvements
be conveyed to the tribe during the lease term. Residential, Business, and Wind and Solar
Resource Leases on Indian Land, 76 Fed. Reg. 73,784, 73,806 (proposed 25 C.F.R. §
162.415(a)) (business leases, including biomass), 73,822-23 (proposed 25 C.F.R. §
162.541(a)) (wind and solar leases) (Nov. 29, 2011). In addition, with Interior's approval,
leases may provide for alternative forms of compensation such as in-kind consideration,
and for varying types of compensation at different stages of the lease. Id. at 73,808
(proposed 25 C.F.R. § 162.426(a)) (biomass), 73,821 (proposed 25 C.F.R. § 162.552(a))
(wind and solar) .
119. See, e.g., Connolly, supra note 9, at 26 (noting that for reasons such as these,
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Tribes that want a more active role in renewable energy
development must use more creative means. One example is Koda
Energy, a limited liability company formed under Delaware law
between the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community as
majority partner and Rahr Malting, a non-Indian company.'20 At
present, Koda Energy operates a heat and power plant that burns
biomass, located a few miles from the Shakopee Mdewakanton
Reservation. But if Koda Energy were, for example, to lease tribal
lands for wind farm purposes, then the tribe would act not only as
lessor, but also as developer through its stake in the energy
company. While an arrangement like this puts tribes in a more
active role, it does so indirectly and with some potential drawbacks.
As a state corporation engaged in off-reservation activities, Koda
Energy is subject to state law and state courts. Even if it were acting
on tribal lands, it might still be subject to state law and might not
enjoy tax advantages available to tribes entering into direct
agreements with energy partners.' 2 ' Clear statutory authority for
"[t]he Campo tribe seeks an ownership stake in all projects on the reservation as a matter
of policy").
120. See Koda Eneigy Fact Sheet, SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTAON SIoux CMTY.,
www.shakopeedakota.org/newsroom/fact-sheets/koda-energy-fact-sheet (last visited Oct.
22, 2011); DIV. OF CORPS., STATE OF DEL., https://delecorp.delaware.gov/tin/controllei
(providing information of Koda Energy LLC's status).
121. Although states may be able to impose taxes on non-Indian development
companies for their on-reservation activities, see, for example, Cotton Petroleum Corp. v.
New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989), Indian tribes acting on tribal lands are immune from
state taxation without express congressional consent, Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of
Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 768 (1985). Thus, the tribal share of an on-reservation joint energy
development project may be free from state taxes, even though the non-Indian partner's
share may be taxable. See Lynn H. Slade, Indian Tribes-Business Parners and Market
Participantl/s: Strategies fir Ifective Tribal/Industry Partnetship, in NATURAL RESOURCES
DEVELOPMENT ON INDIAN LANDS 3B, 3B-35 (Rocky Mt. Mineral L. Inst. 2011); Royster,
sufnr note 115, at 592-94. Courts are split on whether states can tax and otherwise exercise
authority over state corporations in which an Indian tribe or tribal members are partners.
Some courts treat a majority-Indian-owned state corporation as an Indian entity. See, e.g.,
Pourier v. Dep't of Revenue, 658 N.W. 2d 395 (S.D. 2003) (barring state tax on the
importation of motor fuels for a state corporation with tribal member as sole shareholder);
E. Navajo Indtus., Inc. v. Bureau of Reventue, 552 P.2d 805 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976) (barring
state gross receipts taxes for a state corporation fifty-one percent owned by tribal
members). Other courts, however, refuse to find that the legal fiction of the corporation is
a member of the tribe or tribal entity. See, e.g., Baraga Prod., Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue,
971 F. Supp. 294 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (holding that a state corporation with a tribal member
as the sole shareholder is subject to state single business tax); Airvator, Inc. v. Turtle
Mountain Mfg. Co., 329 N.W.2d 596 (N.D. 1983) (holding that a state corporation fifty-
one percent owned by a tribe is subject to the jurisdiction of state court); see also
Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation v. Thurston Cnty. Bd. of Equalization,
No. C08-5562BHS, 2010 WL 1406524 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 2, 2010) (noting that the tribe
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tribes to enter into non-lease arrangements for renewable energy
resources would allow tribes a more direct route to participate in
renewable energy development.
IV. ITEDSA: THE SOLUTION THAT ISN'T
Perhaps the solution is one nice neat statutory package that
would authorize a tribe to develop any or all of its energy
resources-without regard to whether those resources constitute
"minerals" or not-using whatever type of development deal the
tribe believes is best. And one exists. Under the Indian Tribal
Energy Development and Self-Determination Act (ITEDSA) of
2005,122 tribes may enter into leases or agreements of any kind for
the development of any energy resource. ITEDSA solves many of
the problems noted here with the scattershot statutory approach.
First, it unambiguously applies to all energy resources.
Although the statute does not contain a definition of energy
resources, the implementing regulations define energy resources
as "both renewable and nonrenewable energy sources, including,
but not limited to, natural gas, oil, uranium, coal, nuclear, wind,
solar, geothermal, biomass, and hydrological resources." 3 There
is simply no question, as there is with the minerals statutes, that
renewable energy sources are covered along with traditional
energy minerals.
Second, ITEDSA normalizes the lease and agreement term.
With the exception of oil and gas leases, which may be entered
into for the standard ten years and so long thereafter as the oil or
gas is produced in paying. quantities, 124 all leases and agreements
run for a maximum of thirty years, with an option to renew at the
discretion of the tribe. 25 Having a single term applicable to all
energy development eliminates the confusion of twenty-five years
withdrew the claim that a company that was fifty-one percent owned by the tribe was a
tribal entity for purposes of state personal property tax).
122. Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 3501-06 (2006); see also 25 C.F.R. pt. 224 (2011).
123. 25 C.F.R. § 224.30. The ITEDSA definition, however, includes only energy
resources, and excludes non-energy minerals such as sand and gravel. I have argued
elsewhere that the ITEDSA definition should be amended to include non-energy minerals.
See Judith V. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, Political Sovereignty, and the Indian Tribal Energy
Development and Self-Determination Act, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1065, 1082-83 (2008).
124. The 1938 IMLA applied this term to all mineral leases of tribal land. 25 U.S.C.
§ 396(a).
125. Id. §§ 3504(a) (2) (B), 3504(c).
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for surface leases, ten years for agricultural leases, and five years to
accomplish forest products harvesting. Moreover, the thirty-year
term is sufficiently long, especially with a thirty-year renewal
option, to justify the necessary investments by the non-Indian
parties.
Third, ITEDSA adopts the best innovation of the 1982 IMDA: it
opens up the tribal role beyond that of passive lessor or seller.
Tribes are authorized to enter into leases or business agreements,
without limitation on the kind or structure, "for the purpose of
energy resource development on tribal land." 26 Business
agreements are broadly defined in the regulations as "[a]ny
permit, contract, joint venture, option, or other agreement that
furthers any activity related to locating, producing, transporting, or
marketing energy resources on tribal land," and "[a]ny other
business agreement entered into or subject to administration
under a TERA [tribal energy resource agreement]."1 27 A tribe
would thus be free, for example, to enter into a joint operating
agreement for the construction and operation of solar collectors,
something that is unavailable, or at best uncertain, under current
statutory authority. The IMDA allows joint ventures, but its
applicability to renewable energy resources is questionable: § 415
allows the placement of solar panels and collectors on tribal land,
but it is restricted to leases only. ITEDSA eliminates the problems
inherent in using these statutes for renewable energy production
by authorizing non-lease arrangements for alternative energy
production.
Fourth, ITEDSA goes a leap beyond most current statutes, and
eliminates the cumbersome step of secretarial approval for every
lease and business agreement. Under ITEDSA, tribes may enter
into these instruments on their own authorization, without
involving the Secretary of the Interior.128 This provision eliminates
one of the drawbacks of the existing development statutes-
mineral, surface, forest, and agricultural. As discussed earlier,
those statutes generally require the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior for each lease, agreement, or sale, with its attendant time
delays and the possibility that the Secretary could deny
development desired by the tribe.
ITEDSA thus presents a solution to the problems with other
126. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(1).
127. 25 C.F.R. § 224.30 (2011).
128. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(a).
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development statutes discussed in Parts II and III. So what is the
drawback? The drawback to ITEDSA is that an Indian tribe, to
enter into energy leases and agreements without specific
secretarial approval, must first enter into a tribal energy resource
agreement (TERA) with the Secretary of the Interior.129 The
development of a TERA requires a tribe to meet a number of
statutory criteria, develop an extensive tribal environmental review
process for each energy development project, and demonstrate to
the Secretary that the tribe has "sufficient capacity to regulate the
development" of its energy resources.130 At present, only a handful
of tribes even potentially meets the last requirement. Although
several tribes have expressed interest in developing a TERA,' 3 by
mid-2011 no tribe had submitted a TERA application. 32
This signifies that ITEDSA, designed as a solution, in fact is not
one for the vast majority of tribes with energy resources. The front-
end costs of time, money, and staffing to develop a TERA and
shepherd it through the approval process are substantial, if not
prohibitive. 33 The back-end costs of providing an environmental
review process and addressing public input into tribal decisions
and compliance are similarly substantial. These costs mean that
ITEDSA may ultimately be useful to only a small cadre of tribes
with considerable energy resources to develop.134 For a tribe
129. Id. § 3504(a).
130. Id. § 3504(e) (2); see also 25 C.F.R. § 224.53(f). The TERA process is subject to
considerable critique: it covers only energy resources, does not adequately address tribal
financial and technical concerns, mandates significant public input into tribal decision-
making both through the required environmental review process and in requiring public
notice and comment on TERA applications, authorizes "interested party" challenges to
tribal compliance with TERAs, and limits federal trust responsibilities to tribes. See Royster,
supra note 123, at 1080-81; see also Kathleen R. Unger, Note, Change Is in the Wind: Self
Detennination and Wind Power Through 7ibal Energy Resource Agreements, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
329, 356-57 (2009) (critiquing the "inherently Federal functions" exception to activities
that tribes may regulate under TERAs).
131. See Indian Energy Hearing, supra note 1, at 45 (statement of Dr. Robert W.
Middleton, Director, Office of Indian Energy and Economic Development, Department of
the Interior) (noting that "[s]everal tribes" had already expressed interest in pursuing a
TERA, and that the Department of the Interior had convened a national meeting with
interested tribes).
132. See 157 CONG. REc. S6463 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2011) (statement of Sen. Barrasso);
see abo Discussion Draft Hearing, supra note 52, at 19-20 (statement of Hon. Matthew J. Box,
Chairman, Southern Ute Indian Tribe) (noting that although the tribe was a "vigorous
supporter" of ITEDSA, neither it nor any other tribe has entered into a TERA because of
the difficulties and uncertainties involved).
133. See Royster, supra note 123, at 1081-82 (detailing the TERA process).
134. See id. at 1101 ("The TERA approach tinder ITEDSA is not the best approach
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seeking to place a few solar collectors on tribal land or harvest
forest residues as biomass, however, the TERA process may be
more of a barrier than an opportunity.135
V. SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES
Since the enactment of ITEDSA in 2005, Congress has
considered a number of measures that would impact tribal
development of renewable energy resources. Following a Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs hearing on energy development in
2008,136 the Committee issued an Indian Energy Concept Paper
which identified "outdated laws and cumbersome regulations" as
one of the primary barriers to tribal energy development.3 7 The
Committee held a follow-up hearing in 2009,'13 and from that
emerged the proposed Indian Energy Parity Act (IEPA) of 2010,'13
which contained amendments to the TERA process. The IEPA was
referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs, which took no action
on the bill before the end of the session.140 In October 2011,
Senator Barrasso introduced the Indian Tribal Energy
Development and Self-Determination Act Amendments of 2011.141
In addition, the proposed HEARTH Act, which would amend the
surface leasing process to include a TERA-like process, was
introduced in 2010 and referred to the Senate Committee on
for all mineral-owning tribes, but it will be the best approach for some.").
135. (f Unger, supa note 130, at 361-62 (arguing that wind power presents the best
case for use of TERAs, largely because wind power has fewer environmental impacts and
thus raises fewer concerns about tribal regulatory authority and the federal trust
responsibility).
136. Indian Enerj Ileating, su/ra note 1.
137. See Press Release, Dorgan and Barrasso Release Concept Paper on Indian
Energy and Energy Efficiency (Sept. 10, 2009), available at http://indian.senate.gov/
news/ 1)ressreleases/2009-09-10.cfm (copy of Concept Paper on file with author). The
other two significant barriers identified by the Concept Paper were lack of access to the
transmission grid and difficulty obtaining financing and investment.
138. Indian Ener Ilearing, suna note 13.
139. S. 3752, 111th Cong. (2010). See geremally Kelly de la Torre & Robert S.
Thompson III, The Indian Enegy Pomolion and Patily Art of 2010: Oppotilunit'is fior Renwable
Energy Prjeclts in Indian Counity, in NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ON INDIAN LANDS
8-1 (Rocky Mtn. Mineral L. Inst. 2011).
140. A hearing was held on the IEPA discussion draft in April 2010 before the bill
was introduced in Arugust. See Discussion Drafi Heating, su/na note 52.
141. S. 1684, 112th Cong. (2011). The TERA amendments are "intended to facilitate
the use of that section-to make the process easier for Indian tribes to follow and more
predictable-b[y] clearing away some of the red tape and other impediments." 157
CONG. REc. S6463 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2011) (statement of Sen. Barrasso). The bill was
referred to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs.
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Indian Affairs. 42 Although the Committee approved the bill, the
Senate did not act on it before the end of session.14 3 The HEARTH
Act was then reintroduced in 2011.144
These congressional initiatives demonstrate that Congress is
aware of some of the major shortcomings of the current Indian
energy legislation.145 Nonetheless, the proposals to streamline the
TERA process and to provide a TERA-like alternative for surface
leases, while welcome measures, are ultimately flawed. Despite
easing the burden of seeking a TERA, the proposed energy bills
might not offer enough relief to persuade many tribes to submit
TERA applications. And the HEARTH Act proposals not only
replicate many of the TERA-process drawbacks, but continue to
restrict tribes to leasing their lands, and raise questions about their
applicability to renewable energy development.
A. Proposed Surface Leasing Amendments
The HEARTH Act would amend § 415146 to authorize tribes to
enter into surface leases without secretarial approval if the tribe
has surface leasing regulations approved by the Secretary.14 7 At the
urging of the National Congress of American Indians,148 the
Indian Energy Parity Act bill included a virtually identical
provision.149
At present, § 415 authorizes only a few named tribes to bypass
the process of obtaining secretarial approval of individual leases. 150
142. S. 3235, 111th Cong. (2010). HEARTH is the acronym for Helping Expedite
and Advance Responsible Tribal Homeownership, although the bills go well beyond home
ownership promotion.
143. See 157 CONG. REc. S2048, S2051 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 2011) (statement of Sen.
Barrasso).
144. S. 703, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 205, 112th Cong. (2011). The bills were
referred to the appropriate committees in each house.
145. Senator John Barrasso (R-Wyo.) and former Senator Byron Dorgan (D-N.D.)
deserve special mention. Senator Barrasso, elected to the Senate in 2008, is the sponsor of
the HEARTH Act of 2011 and one of the sponsors of the ITEDSA Amendments of 2011.
The HEARTH Act of 2010 and the Indian Energy Parity Act bill of 2010 (in part) were
sponsored by Senator Dorgan, who retired from the Senate in 2010.
146. Indian Long-Term Leasing Act, 25 U.S.C. § 415 (2006). See supra Part Il.A. 1.
147. S. 703, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); H.R. 205, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
148. See Discussion Draft Jlearing, supra note 52, at 11 (testimony of the National
Congress of American Indians) (urging that IEPA include provisions similar to the
HEARTH Act).
149. S. 3752, 111th Cong. § 301(d) (2010).
150. 25 U.S.C. § 415(d)-(e).
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Four Washington State tribes may enter into nonrenewable leases
if the lease is executed under tribal regulations approved by the
Secretary.' 5' The Navajo Nation may develop tribal regulations that
are consistent with federal regulations and provide for an
environmental review process, and submit those regulations to the
Secretary for approval. Once the Secretary approves the tribal
regulations, the Nation may enter into most business or
agricultural leases for twenty-five years, plus an option to renew for
up to two additional terms, without secretarial approval of the
specific lease. 52 The proposed HEARTH Act would extend the
Navajo authority to all Indian tribes. 53
In essence, the current Navajo Leasing Act and the proposed
HEARTH Act replicate for surface leases the provisions of a TERA
for energy leases and agreements.'54 Like the TERA provision of
ITEDSA, the proposed HEARTH Act is intended to promote tribal
self-determination and control over tribal lands. 55 Like the TERA
provision, the proposed HEARTH Act would authorize a
sufficiently long lease term, especially with the options to renew, to
encourage both tribal and non-Indian investment. Like the TERA
provision, the proposed HEARTH Act would remove the delay and
other frustrations attendant on secretarial approval of each specific
instrument authorized by the tribe. But also like the TERA
provision, the proposed HEARTH Act requires any interested tribe
to engage in a lengthy and costly process of developing approvable
regulations, and to agree to undertake lengthy and costly
environmental reviews.156
In addition, the HEARTH Act as drafted, as well as the existing
151. Id. § 415(b) (Tulalip Tribes, Puyallup Tribe, Swinomish Indian Tribal
Community, and Kalispel Tribe). The lease terms may be either thirty years or seventy-five
years; it appears from the statutory language that the tribal regulations authorizing these
leases must be specific to one lease term or the other.
152. Id. § 415(e)(1), (3). The Nation may also enter into seventy-five year leases for
"public, religious, educational, recreational, or residential purposes" on the same basis.
153. S. 703, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); H.R. 205, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
154. See sun/n Part IV.
155. See 157 CONG. REC. S2048, S2051 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 2011) (statement of Sen.
John Barrasso); The Ielping Expedite and Advance Responsible Tribal IIomeowniship Act of
2011, Ilearing on S. 703 13efte S. Comm. on Indian Ajfabis, 112th Cong. (2011) 9 [hereinafter
HEARTII Act Ilearing] (statement of Donald "Del" Laverdure, Principal Dep. Assist. Sec.
for Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior); id. at 57 (statement of the National
Congress of American Indians).
156. The Navajo Nation stated that it took "several years to develop" the required
tribal regulations under its § 415 authority. Tribal Enerqg Hearing, sunra note 1, at 109
(Navajo Nation Response to Questions on S. 424 and S. 522).
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Navajo Leasing Act, contains a provision with the potential to
render the new process useless for renewable energy development.
Although the Act authorizes twenty-five-year surface leases without
secretarial approval, it specifically excepts "a lease for the
exploration, development, or extraction of any mineral
resources." 57 Neither the proposed legislation nor the Navajo
Leasing Act defines "mineral resources." It is likely that any
eventual regulations would define the term, and that definition is
likely to parallel the definition of minerals for the IMLA and
IMDA: that is, traditional minerals, fossil fuels, uranium,
geothermal, and "any other energy or non-energy mineral." 5 8
And that leads back to the problem discussed in Part II of whether
renewable energy sources such as wind, solar, and biomass are
considered minerals for purposes of federal statutes.
It is doubtful that the HEARTH Act sponsors intended to
exclude renewable energy projects such as wind farms from the
new process. Senator Barrasso, in his comments introducing the
legislation, stated that the bill would streamline the leasing process
and reduce delays for tribes pursuing "economic development
opportunities, providing housing and developing natural resources on
Indian lands." 1 59 The Department of the Interior praised the bill
for its role "in promoting homeownership, economic
development, and renewable energy development by restoring tribal
authority over tribal lands."1 60 Moreover, the same § 415
amendments were proposed as part of the IEPA, a bill specifically
focused on energy development.161 It thus appears that the bill
sponsors intended to except only leases for the extractive minerals
(including exploration and development activities), not any
mineral resources. In all likelihood, the sponsors were not
considering that "mineral resources" might include non-extractive
renewable energy resources. Incorporating a definition of mineral
157. S. 703, 112th Cong. § 2(b) (2011); H.R. 205, 112th Cong. § 2(h) (1) (2011); see
also 25 U.S.C. § 415(e) (1) (2006) (Navajo Leasing Act).
158. See 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (IMDA); 25 C.F.R. § 211.3 (2011) (IMIA regulations);
id. § 225.3 (IMDA regulations). This would also likely serve as a default definition pending
regulations.
159. 157 CONG. REC. S2048, S2051 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 2011) (statement of Sen.John
Barrasso) (emphasis added).
160. HIARTTI Act Hearing, supra note 155, at 9 (statement of Donald "Del"
Laverdure, Principal Dep. Assist. Sec'y for Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior)
(emphasis added).
161. S. 3752, 111th Cong. § 301(d) (2010).
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resources in the HEARTH Act bill would go far in clarifying the
scope of the bill for renewable energy projects.
The proposed HEARTH Act, should it become law, thus
promises only a limited solution to the issues posed by the current
statutes available for renewable energy projects. It is a welcome
and well-intentioned attempt to authorize Indian tribes to exercise
much greater control over the surface leases of their lands. 62 It
suffers, however, from several drawbacks. First, it requires a TERA-
like process of tribal regulations approved by the Secretary.
Although it may well be easier for tribes to develop those
regulations for surface leasing than for energy development, the
process itself imposes delay, cost, and resource commitment at the
front end. The process also requires that tribes be willing to
undertake extensive environmental reviews of proposed leases.
More tribes may take advantage of the HEARTH Act provision
than have pursued a TERA, but the numbers of tribes willing and
able to do so may still be small. Second, whether the HEARTH Act
may be applied to renewable energy projects is in doubt; the
language excepting leases for "any mineral resources" activities
needs clarification. And finally, the HEARTH Act, as an
amendment to a leasing act, continues to authorize tribal leases
only. A tribe choosing the HEARTH Act process would be entitled
to enter into, without secretarial approval, only leases, not other
types of development instruments.
B. Proposed TERA Amendments
The Concept Paper issued by the Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs, the subsequent hearing testimony, the proposed Indian
Energy Parity Act of 2010 (IEPA), and the proposed Indian Tribal
Energy Development and Self-Determination Act Amendments of
2011 (ITEDSA Amendments) all address amendments to ITEDSA
and the TERA process.'63 The Concept Paper called for making
"the TERA process a more practical, effective and attractive
162. See IIEAR771 Act Hearing, supra note 155, at 10 (statement of Donald "Del"
Laverdure, Principal Deputy Assistant Sec'y for Indian Affairs, Dep't of the Interior) ("The
Department strongly supports" the bill.); id. at 56 (testimony of the National Congress of
American Indians) ("NCAI strongly supports" the bill; including text of NCAI Resolution
#PSP-09-016 in support of the bill.).
163. The primary focus of the first three, however, was on issues of streamlining the




alternative to the IMDA or the Mineral Leasing Act." '6 The IEPA
and the ITEDSA Amendments propose nearly identical
amendments to address some of the more troublesome provisions
of the TERA process.165 In particular, the proposals modify the
tribal environmental review process, expand a tribe's ability to
demonstrate regulatory capability, and streamline the Secretary's
approval process for TERAs.
Currently, a TERA must include a tribal environmental review
process that substantially parallels the federal environmental
review process under the National Environmental Policy Act. 66
Tribes objected to the environmental review requirement both
because of the substantial costs involved and because of the
inroads on tribal self-determination.1 6 7 Not only would the process
mandate considerable public input into tribal decision-making,
but the federal government would be decreeing how tribes
approach balancing environmental concerns and development.
The bills. modify the TERA environmental review process in
two significant ways. First, rather than require a tribal
environmental review to identify mitigation measures and
incorporate them into the lease or agreement, the bills provide for
the identification and incorporation of mitigation measures "if
any" that the tribe in its discretion chooses to propose. 168 Second,
a new provision would permit a tribe to identify categories of
actions deemed not to have significant effects on the environment
and therefore excluded from environmental review. 69 Although
164. Concept Paper, supra note 137, at 4. No specific proposals were included. The
generality of this suggestion stands in contrast to the document's fairly detailed ideas
regarding federal processing of permits, financial incentives, and energy efficiency.
165. See S. 3752, 111th Cong. § 307 (2010); S. 1684, 112th Cong. § 103 (2011).
Because the proposals are virtually identical for the aspects discussed here, citations will be
to the proposed 2011 ITEDSA Amendments.
166. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e) (2)(C) (2006). The National Environmental Policy Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (2006), requires environmental reviews for all "major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." Id. § 4332(C). Federal
approval of a lease or other use of Indian lands is a federal action triggering NEPA review.
See Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972). Under a TERA, however, the Secretary
no longer approves specific leases or agreements, rendering NEPA inapplicable to those
instruments.
167. See Royster, supra note 123, at 1090-95 (discussing TERA environmental review
provision and tribal concerns).
168. S. 1684, 112th Cong. § 103(a) (4) (A) (iii) (2011).
169. Id. (amending 25 U.S.C. § 3504 to add § 3504(e) (2) (C) (vi)). The identification
of categorical exclusions from the environmental review process would parallel what the
federal government may do under the National Environmental Policy Act regulations. See
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these amendments would not eliminate tribal concerns with the
TERA environmental review process, they would provide some
relief both by streamlining the process and enhancing the role of
tribal decision-making.
In addition, the bills substantially alter the ways in which a tribe
may show the required capacity to regulate energy development.
Under the current TERA process, the Secretary may not approve a
TERA unless the tribe demonstrates "sufficient capacity to regulate
the development of energy resources." 70 The proposed bills
provide instead that the Secretary shall disapprove a proposed
TERA that does not demonstrate sufficient regulatory capacity,t7l
but further provides that meeting that criterion is not the only way
in which a tribe "shall be considered to have demonstrated
sufficient capacity." 72 Sufficient capacity can be demonstrated in
two additional ways. First, if the Secretary fails to determine within
the statutory time period that a tribe has not demonstrated
sufficient capacity, then the tribe is considered to have done so. 7 3
Second, if the Secretary determines that a tribe has successfully
carried out a Public Law 638 compact or contract"' for at least
three consecutive years, the tribe shall also be considered to have
demonstrated capacity.175
These amendments would ease the TERA process for tribes.
40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(a) (2011).
170. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e) (2) (B) (i); see also 25 C.F.R. § 224.53(f) (requirements for
tribal showing of capacity to r"egulate).
171. S. 1684, 112th Cong. § 103(a)(4)(A)(ii) (2011) (amending 25 U.S.C.
§ 3504(e) (2) (B) (i)). The bill provides that the Secretary may only disapprove a proposed
TERA if the Secretary makes this determination, or if the proposed TERA would violate
federal law or (oes not include a required provision.
172. Id. § 103(a) (4) (A) (iii) (adding new§ 3504(e) (2) (H)).
173. In addition, the time period for the Secretary to determine whether a tribe had
demonstrated capacity would be shortened to 120 days, although the tribe and the
Secretary could mutually agree to an extension. Id. § 103(a)(4)(A)(iii) (adding new
§ 3504(e) (2) (C)).
174. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88
Stat. 2203 (1974) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 450 el seq. (2006)). Under Public Law 638, tribes
may enter into contracts to take over administration of federal programs or enter into self-
governance compacts for the administration of all Department of the Interior Indian
programs. Seegenerally COHEN'S HANDBOOK, su/nri note 34, at § 22.02.
175. S. 1684, 112th Cong. § 103(a) (4) (A) (iii) (2011) (adding new § 3504(e) (2) (H)).
The tribe must have carried out the contract or compact without material audit exceptions
or without any such exceptions that were not corrected within a three-year period prior to
the TERA application. Under current TERA regulations, a tribe's Public Law 638 contracts




There is a subtle but important shift in the burden of
demonstrating sufficient capacity. Rather than place the whole
burden on the tribe to demonstrate sufficient capacity, the
Secretary is now charged with determining its absence from the
evidence in the tribe's TERA application. Moreover,.the Secretary
is held to a short time frame to make that determination, and the
consequence of the Secretary's failure to act in a timely manner
benefits rather than disadvantages the tribal applicant. In addition,
acknowledging successful Public Law 638 compacts and contracts
as the equivalent of demonstrating capacity recognizes tribes'
existing accomplishments in administering federal laws and
programs. Providing that a tribe with a successful Public Law 638
record need not redemonstrate its governmental and regulatory
capabilities is a practical recognition of tribal self-government.
Finally, the bills would streamline the approval timeline for
TERAs. Currently, the Secretary has 270 days from receipt of a
complete TERA application to approve or disapprove the TERA. 176
There is, however, no consequence attached to the Secretary's
failure to meet this deadline. Because one of the primary tribal
concerns that the TERA process was meant to address was the
often substantial delay in secretarial approval of leases and
agreements, it would indeed be ironic if a tribe had to wait years
for approval of a TERA to avoid such delays. Consequently, the
bills provide that 271 days after the tribe submits its TERA
application, the TERA "shall" become effective if the Secretary has
not disapproved it.177 Although this may put substantial pressure
on the Department of the Interior, 78 it furthers the intent of the
Indian energy acts to promote tribal control over the development
of their energy resources.
VI. SOME IMPERFECT PROPOSALS
There is no perfect solution to streamlining renewable energy
176. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e) (2) (A); see ato 25 C.F.R. § 224.56 (providing that the time
can be extended with the consent of the tribe). If a tribe submits a revised TERA, the
Secretary has sixty days to approve or disapprove it.
177. S. 1684, 112th Cong. § 103(a)(4)(A)(i) (2011) (amending 25 U.S.C.
§ 3504(e) (2) (A)). If the tribe submits a revised TERA, it would take effect in ninety-one
days unless the Secretary disapproved it.
178. The TERA regulations establish a fairly elaborate pre-application process that
should ease the Secretary's burden of acting on the final, complete TERA application
within 270 days. See Royster, Practical Sovereignty, supra note 123, at 1081-82 (explaining the
process).
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development. The "best" approach, certainly, would be for tribes
to develop the capacity and capability to engage in energy
development directly, without the need to invoke any federal
statutory authority. While several tribes are moving in that
direction, it is an unrealistic short-term expectation for most tribes.
For the near future, at least, the vast majority of Indian tribes
seeking to develop their renewable energy resources will need to
partner with non-Indian companies in one form or another.
Renewable energy development on tribal lands will thus be
dependent on statutory authority and, most likely, on secretarial
approval at some point in the development process. The proposals
that follow address these two concerns. First, I propose a fairly
simple amendment to the Indian Mineral Development Act that
would allow tribes to take active roles in the development of their
renewable energy resources. And second, I propose a few
suggestions for streamlining the secretarial approval process under
the IMDA.
These suggestions are necessarily imperfect. Like many of the
recent statutes and pioposed pieces of legislation, they represent a
step in the right direction. But they are equally subject to the
criticism that they don't go far enough. However, these proposals
are offered in the spirit of what perhaps can be done, not what
should be done. And offered as well with the belief that continued
progress toward tribal self-determination in energy development is
preferable to immobility pending a perfect solution.
A. Renewable Energy Resources as IMDA "Minerals"
The heart of my proposal is a small and likely uncontroversial
amendment to the Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982. The
statutory definition of "mineral resources" should be amended to
clarify that mineral resources includes all renewable energy
resources. Although that is arguably the case now, the clear
inclusion of renewable energy resources would remove a point of
contention and confusion.
At present, the IMDA defines "mineral resources" as "oil, gas,
uranium, coal, geothermal, or other energy or nonenergy mineral
resources."179 Congress should amend the definition to something
like, "oil, gas, uranium, coal, other energy and nonenergy mineral
resources, or any renewable energy resources including, but not
179. 25 U.s.C. § 2102(a) (2006).
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limited to, wind, solar, geothermal, biomass, and hydrologic
resources."180 Language such as this leaves no question that
renewable energy resources are included in the scope of the
IMDA.
Alternatively, the definition could be amended in the
regulations without amending the statute itself. The regulatory
definition of minerals for purposes of leases and minerals
agreements expands on the statutory definition: "both
metalliferous and non-metalliferous minerals; all hydrocarbons,
including oil and gas, coal and lignite of all ranks; geothermal
resources; and includes but is not limited to, sand, gravel, pumice,
cinders, granite, building stone, limestone, clay, silt, or any other
energy or non-energy mineral."181 This definition helps to clarify
the meaning of "other" minerals in the statute by specifying such
minerals as sand and gravel. The regulatory definition could
similarly help clarify the meaning of "other energy" in the statute
by specifying that it includes "both renewable and nonrenewable
energy sources, including, but not limited to, wind, solar,
geothermal, biomass, and hydrologic resources."1 82 A statutory
amendment would be preferable to a regulatory amendment, but a
regulatory amendment could likely be accomplished more
quickly.18 3
Expanding the minerals definition of the IMDA to specify
energy resources regardless of their classification would broaden,
simplify, and normalize Indian tribes' ability to engage in
renewable energy development. Any tribe with renewable
resources could enter into any type of development agreement
that suited its needs. Tribes could employ not only the current
structure of leases, but joint ventures, partnerships, and business
agreements of all kinds. This simple amendment would thus
authorize all Indian tribes to move into more active roles in the
180. This language incorporates elements of the regulatory definition of energy
resources for purposes of ITEDSA. See 25 C.F.R. § 224.30 (2011).
181. 25 C.F.R. § 211.3 (defining "minerals" for the purpose of leases); id. § 225.3
(defining "minerals" for the purpose of minerals agreements).
182. This language is borrowed from the regulatory definition of energy resources
for purposes of ITEDSA. See id. § 224.30.
183. For example, the Department of the Interior proposed new surface leasing
regulations in late 2011 that would create specific regulatory regimes for biomass leases
(included within business leases) and wind and solar leases. Residential, Business, and
Wind and Solar Resource Leases on Indian Land, 76 Fed. Reg. 73,784 (Nov. 29, 2011).
The proposed regulations are intended to "expedite economic development and spur
renewable energy development in Indian Country." DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 56.
2012] 129
STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LA WJOURNAL
development of their renewables. Tribes seeking to partner with
non-Indian companies to develop wind farms, solar collectors, or
biomass feedstock operations would no longer be confined to the
passive role of lessor. And it makes common sense. There is no
reason to deny a tribe with wind resources the ability to enter into
a joint venture, for example, when a tribe with coal resources may
do so.
Clarifying that the IMDA may be used for renewables
development could, however, impact the tribes' ability to use § 81
easements for wind and solar power development. Under current §
81 regulations, contracts and agreements that encumber Indian
lands do not need secretarial approval if they are subject to
approval under another statute or regulation, specifically
including surface leases, agricultural leases, timber contracts,
mineral leases, and minerals agreements. 84 The regulations thus
appear to put those types of leases and agreements, including
IMDA leases and agreements, outside § 81. If the IMDA definition
of minerals is amended to specifically include renewable energy
resources, then it may mean that a tribe could no longer use § 81
for renewable energy easements.
To prevent this possible unintended consequence, a further
amendment to the IMDA may be necessary. The IMDA now
provides that nothing in the statute "shall affect" the Indian
Mineral Leasing Act "or any other law authorizing the
development or disposition of the mineral resources of an Indian
or Indian tribe."185 An amendment to clarify that it also does not
affect tribes' authority to enter into § 81 easements would preserve
that option for renewable energy development. This amendment
would need to be carefully worded, however, if Congress wished to
preserve the current practice that § 81 contracts and agreements
cannot otherwise be used to substitute for mineral leases and
agreements.
It is possible that a broader amendment may be necessary to
preserve tribes' options under other statutes if the IMDA
definition of minerals is expanded to include renewables. The
proposed expansion of the IMDA suggested here is not intended
to replace any existing authorities, but to supplement them. Just as
the IMDA authorization of minerals agreements did not replace
184. 25 C.F.R. § 84.004(a).
185. 25 U.S.C. § 2105.
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the IMLA authority to enter into mineral leases, and the TERA
process for energy agreements did not replace either IMDA
agreements or IMLA leases,186 the proposed expansion of the
IMDA is intended as one more option for tribes.
Under the proposed amendment to the IMDA definition of
minerals, for example, a tribe seeking to construct a wind farm on
tribal land could do so using a lease under § 415, an easement
under § 81, a negotiated lease or other minerals agreement under
the IMDA, or an agreement pursuant to an approved TERA under
ITEDSA. The tribe could weigh the advantages and drawbacks of
each alternative, and chose the one that best suits its needs.
Including a statement in the IMDA that it is not intended to
replace other existing options would preserve tribes' self-
determination rights to choose the best approach for that tribe.
Wind power development, in fact, contains a cautionary tale
about preserving tribes' development options under the various
statutory approaches. Because of the structure of federal tax
incentives, a tribal ownership stake in a wind power deal may
actually decrease the profitability of the enterprise. Federal tax
incentives, which currently can account for a majority of the
profitability of wind power projects, are only available to tax-paying
entities and thus are not available to tribes. 8 7 To take advantage of
the tax credits, a tribe seeking wind power development would
consequently be more likely to use an instrument that did not
retain a tribal ownership interest, such as a surface lease or an
easement, or perhaps a negotiated lease under the IMDA. Tribes
do currently have available the alternative of a "flip" project, in
which the tribe initially owns only a one percent interest. 88 At the
end of the ten-year life of the tax credits, the project is "flipped"
from the private investor to the tribe. If IMDA minerals
agreements were available to tribes, such an agreement could be
structured in much the same way.
186. See id. § 3504(a) (noting that pursuing the TERA option is "at the discretion of
the Indian tribe").
187. See Connolly, supra note 9, at 26; Mark Shahinian, The Tax Man Cometh Not: How
the Non-Transferability of Tax Credits Harms Indian Tribes, 32 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 267 (2007-
08) (discussing the problems of non-transferability in the context of wind projects).
188. See de la Torre & Thompson, supra note 139, at 8-4 to 8-5 (discussing "flip"
projects and their risks).
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B. Secretarial Approval
The proposed amendment to the definition of "mineral
resources" in the IMDA would eliminate one of the serious
disadvantages of the statutes presently available for renewable
energy development by allowing tribes to take as active a role in
the development process as they choose. But it does not address
the other major drawback, that of secretarial approval. Under the
IMDA, the Secretary is responsible for individually approving every
negotiated lease and minerals agreement.
Discarding any approval role for the Secretary of the Interior is,
at least in the short term, unrealistic. In only one limited situation
relevant to renewable energy has Congress eliminated secretarial
approval entirely: the 2000 amendment to § 81 to authorize
contracts or agreements that encumber Indian lands for less than
seven years without any federal approval. As noted earlier, § 81
applies only if other statutory authority does not.
More commonly, Congress has been willing to ease up on the
Secretary's approval power, allowing tribes to bypass federal
approval of specific instruments if a more global approval has
already been granted. Thus, the original ten-year authority of
section 17 corporations to lease without secretarial approval was
expanded in 1990 to twenty-five years. Nonetheless, the section 17
corporate charter itself is issued by the Secretary, and the powers
granted in the charter are thus subject to secretarial approval. The
surface leasing statute was amended several times to authorize
specific tribes to lease without secretarial approval of the individual
lease, as long as the tribe first has in place tribal regulations
approved by the Secretary. Legislation introduced in the 111th and
112th Con'gresses would have extended this authority to all tribes.
Similarly, the TERA process enacted in 2005 authorizes any tribe
to use the same approach for energy leases and agreements.
While these statutes and amendments clearly indicate a trend
toward a somewhat less intrusive role for the Secretary, it is equally
clear that Congress wants some level of federal oversight for long-
term encumbrances of Indian lands. It is willing to have that
oversight one step removed from specific development
instruments, but not removed altogether. Any realistic solution at
this point, therefore, must retain some sort of secretarial approval.
Nonetheless, there are steps that can be taken to tighten up the
approval process and make it friendlier to renewable energy
development. The two amendments to the IMDA proposed here
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would provide that the Secretary's failure to act within the time
allotted constitutes approval, and that in determining whether a
minerals agreement is in the tribe's bestinterest, the Secretary will
defer to the tribe's decision.
Under the IMDA, the Secretary has 180 days to approve or
disapprove a minerals agreement, or 60 days after compliance with
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), whichever is
later. 89 The statute specifically provides that the Secretary's failure
to meet the deadline is enforceable by a mandamus action in
federal court.190 Making the Secretary's deadline mandatory is
useful, but authorizing enforcement by court action is not. Civil
suits proceed slowly through the federal courts, and it is unlikely
that a writ of mandamus would be issued before the Secretary
reached a decision on the minerals agreement. Waiting two years
for the court's decision is no better than waiting two years for the
Secretary's.
A better approach would borrow from the proposed statutory
amendments to the TERA process. The proposed TERA
amendments would replace a provision giving the Secretary 270
days to approve a TERA, with a provision that 271 days after the
tribe submits its TERA application, the TERA "shall" become
effective if the Secretary has not disapproved it.191 A similar
amendment to the IMDA could provide that 181 days after the
tribe submits a proposed minerals agreement, or 61 days after
compliance with NEPA, whichever is later, the agreement "shall"
take effect if the Secretary has not disapproved it or has not
provided the tribe with written findings of the intent to approve or
disapprove the agreement.192 As with the proposed TERA
189. 25 U.S.C. § 2103(a) (2006).
190. Id. (authorizing enforcement action under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2006) ("The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to
compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a
duty owed to the plaintiff.")).
191. S. 1684, 112th Cong. § 103(a)(4)(A)(i) (2011) (amending 25 U.S.C.
§3504(e)(2)(A)). Proposed regulations for biomass, wind, and solar leases similarly
provide that amendments to leases and subleases will be deemed approved if the
Department of the Interior fails to act within thirty days, but do not extend that same
approach to secretarial approval of the original lease. Residential, Business, and Wind and
Solar Resource Leases on Indian Land, 76 Fed. Reg. 73,784, 73,810 (proposed § 162.445)
(amendments to business leases, including biomass), 73,811 (proposed § 162.453)
(subleases of business leases), 73,823 (proposed § 162.570) (amendments to wind and
solar leases), 73,824 (proposed § 162.578) (subleases of wind and solar leases) (Nov. 29,
2011).
192. See 25 U.S.C. § 2103(c) (providing that the Secretary shall give a tribe written
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amendment, this would put substantial additional pressure on the
Department of the Interior to act quickly. But the benefit to tribes
of knowing whether their minerals agreements have been
approved, and being able to implement their agreements within a
reasonable time, outweigh those concerns.
The second way to streamline the approval process for
renewable energy resources is to address the substance of the
Secretary's review of mineral agreements. The IMDA provides that
the Secretary must determine whether a proposed agreement "is
in the best interest of the Indian tribe." ' In so doing, the
Secretary "shall consider, among other things, the potential
economic return to the tribe; the potential environmental, social,
and cultural effects on the tribe; and provisions for resolving
disputes that may arise between the parties to the agreement."l 94
The statute expressly provides, however, that the Secretary is not
responsible for preparing any studies regarding "environmental,
socioeconomic, or cultural effects" other than the environmental
studies required by NEPA.19 5
The regulations, on the other hand, require that the Secretary
determine both that the minerals agreement is in the tribe's best
interest and that any adverse cultural, social, or environmental
impacts do not outweigh the benefits of the agreement. 196 The
"best interest" standard is further defined as requiring "the
Secretary [to] consider any relevant factor, including, but- not
limited to: economic considerations, such as date of lease or
minerals agreement expiration; probable financial effects on the
Indian mineral owner; need for change in the terms of the existing
minerals agreement; marketability of mineral products; and
potential environmental, social and cultural effects." 97 The
regulations further specify that the "best interest" standard is
based on information supplied by the parties "and any other
findings of the intent to approve or disapprove at least thirty days prior to formal action);
see also 25 C.F.R. § 225.22(b) (2011). The purpose of the thirty-day window is to allow a
tribe to reconsider the minerals agreement in light of the Secretary's findings, should the
tribe wish to do so. See Quantun Exploration, Inc. v. Clark, 780 F.2d 1457, 1460 (9th Cir.
1986).
193. 25 U.S.C. § 2103(b).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. 25 C.F.R. § 225.22(c) (2011). The IMDA makes consideration of the economic,
social, and cultural aspects part of the best interests analysis, and nota separate factor.
197. Id. § 225.3.
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information considered relevant by the Secretary." 98 That
information may include comparisons to other contracts or offers
for similar resources, "insofar as that information is readily
available. " 199
These standards, derived from judicial determinations that the
Secretary must consider all relevant factors in reviewing mineral
leases under the IMLA,200 place considerable decision-making
power with the Secretary. During the rulemaking process, in fact,
the Department of the Interior rejected a commenter's suggestion
that minerals agreements should be approved if the agreements
were in compliance with law. The Department noted that the law
itself "allow[s] the Secretary the discretion to weigh relevant
factors and require [s] the Secretary to make, on the basis of the
Secretary's judgement, a best interest determination."o20
At the time the IMDA was enacted in 1982, federal Indian
policy had only recently focused on tribal self-determination, 2 02
and Indian tribes were still emerging from the uncertainties and
destruction of the termination era.2 03 The Department of the
Interior had experience with considering all relevant factors in the
approval of IMLA leases, and carried that standard into the new
world of minerals agreements. It took twelve years for the
Department to issue IMDA regulations, but the regulations again
reflected the central role of the Secretary and the importance of
the Secretary's judgment call. In the 1980s and even early 1990s,
the Secretary's stringent oversight may have been justified by the
imbalance of knowledge and bargaining power between tribes and
energy companies.
But nearly twenty years have passed since the regulations were
198. Id. § 225.22(d).
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Okla. v. United States, 966 F.2d 583, 589
(10th Cir. 1992); Kenai Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Dep't of Interior, 671 F.2d 383, 386-87 (10th Cir.
1982).
201. Oil and Gas, Solid Mineral and Geothermal Minerals Agreements, 59 Fed. Reg.
14,960, 14,966 (Mar. 30, 1994).
202. President Richard M. Nixon is generally credited with originating the modern
federal Indian policy of self-determination. See Special Message on Indian Affairs, 1970
PUB. PAPERS 564. President Ronald Reagan issued the first modern federal Indian policy
statement, calling for government-to-government relations, within a year of the IMDA's
enactment. Statement on Indian Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 96 (Jan. 24, 1983).
203. See generally DONALD L. FIXICO, TERMINATION AND RELOCATION: FEDERAL
INDIAN POLICY 1945-1960 (1986) (discussing the formulation, implementation, and effects
of federal policy and legislation toward Indian tribes).
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promulgated in 1994. Indian tribes have thirty years of experience
with IMDA minerals agreements, and many of the energy tribes
have become sophisticated negotiators of development deals.
Certainly tribes are the best determiners of cultural and social
impacts, and often of the economic impacts as well. In light of
those factors, the standards for approval of IMDA agreements are
due for amendment.
Amending the statute itself to revisit the appropriate factors
may be the best choice, but a simpler and perhaps quicker fix is
also available. The Department could amend the regulations to
reflect modern realities. Similar to the best interests determination
in the regulations for agricultural and other surface leases, the
IMDA regulations could provide that in reviewing an IMDA
minerals agreement, the Secretary will defer to the tribe's
determination that the agreement is in its best interest, to the
maximum extent possible. 204 Although the conditional "maximum
extent possible" language preserves the Secretary's ultimate
authority under the statute, the regulation would ensure that the
Secretary will undertake the minerals agreement review process
with due respect for the tribe's decision. Even if a deferential
review is current practice, embedding it in the regulations
strengthens the tribe's role in the decision making process.
VII. CONCLUSION
Renewable energy resources are taking on increased
importance for tribal economies. While these resources are
abundant in Indian country, the federal statutory authority for
their development is dispersed and often problematic. Mineral
development statutes may or may not apply; other statutes not
originally intended for energy development fill the gap, but
generally confine tribes to a passive role in renewables
development. The recent energy statute solves many of the
problems with the other approaches, but creates a process that is
204. See 25 C.F.R. § 162.107(a) (2011) (agricultural and other surface leases) ("In
reviewing a negotiated lease for approval, we will defer to the landowners' determination
that the lease is in their best interest, to the maximum extent possible."). In its proposed
regulatory changes for surface leasing, the Department of the Interior preserved the
language that it will defer to the maximum extent possible to a tribe's determination in a
negotiated lease that the lease is in its best interest. Residential, Business, and Wind and
Solar Resource Leases on Indian Land, 76 Fed. Reg. 73,784, 73,809 (proposed
§ 162.439(a) (5)) (business leases, including biomass), 73,822-23 (proposed
§ 162.564(a) (5)) (wind and solar leases) (Nov. 29, 2011).
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complex and expensive enough to discourage most tribes from
using it. Recent bills would tweak the energy statute and propose
broader leasing authority, but none addresses the overarching
problem of providing tribes with a way to take an active role in the
development of renewable resources without undue expense or
federal oversight.
The amendments to the IMDA and its regulations proposed
here also do not solve that overarching problem entirely. They are
intended to suggest steps in the direction of greater tribal self-
determination in renewable energy development. They would free
tribes to take more active roles in renewable energy projects, while
preserving tribes' ability to use the variety of other available
statutory approaches. And they would rein in the secretarial
approval power by providing that federal inaction benefits the
tribes and by reframing the best interests analysis. Under these
proposals, Indian tribes could more easily develop their renewable
energy resources, and do so with more direct say in the
development itself.
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